Note
AVERTING ARMAGEDDON: PREVENTING
NUCLEAR TERRORISM IN THE UNITED
STATES*
It is difficult to swim in hydrochloric acid with your legs chopped off.1

-Russian General Alexander Lebed
I. INTRODUCTION
General Lebed's quote seems opaque, but the Russian explained
himself by noting that dealing with difficult and fluid situations
requires the ability to adapt.2 The Cold War is over, but the dangers
of nuclear attack have not disappeared. If the United States does not
adapt, Lebed's comment could describe the impossibility of dealing
with one of the greatest threats now facing the United Statesnuclear terrorism.
When a senior Russian general describes his country's efforts to
safeguard nuclear weapons and fissile materials from theft as
"unsatisfactory," 3 it is time to take notice. Since the collapse of the
Soviet empire, the likelihood of a nuclear attack aimed at the United
States has actually increased, and quite substantially.! That risk does
not stem from nuclear war with Russia, China, or some other
country. Rather, the risk is one of nuclear terrorism, with the
*The Author wishes to thank James Miller for his guidance and assistance in the preparation of

this Note.
1. Brian Killen, Russia's Lebed Gets Sweeping Chechnya Powers, Reuter's World Serv.,
Aug. 14,1996 (quoting Alexander Lebed), availablein LEXIS, News Library, Reuwld File.

2. See id.
3. A. M. Rosenthal, Only a Matter of Time, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1996, at A31 (quoting
Alexander Lebed).

4. This is not to say that chemical and biological attacks are of lesser concern. The risk of
a chemical or biological weapons attack on the United States may actually be higher, but the
focus here is on nuclear terror. For a discussion of the chemical and biological threat as it

relates to nuclear weapons, see Steve Fetter, Ballistic Missiles and Weapons of Mass
Destruction,INT'L SEcuRIrrY, Summer 1991, at 5,26.
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weapon itself "hand-delivered."5 Instead of using missiles or
bombers, terrorists could simply smuggle a nuclear weapon into the
United States over land, by plane, or by boat. Author and defense
expert James Dunnigan refers to the "suitcase from Allah," a
terrorist-delivered nuclear weapon, as the ultimate nightmare.6 The
World Trade Center bombing was disturbing enough, but former
nuclear weapons scientist Theodore B. Taylor has estimated that a
device with a half-kiloton yield would be sufficient to knock both
Trade Towers into the Hudson River.7
The threat of nuclear terrorism is often treated as high risk/low
probability,8 and thus is often ignored by both policymakers and the
general public. However, several factors make the possibility of
nuclear terrorism greater than ever. First, a confluence of statesponsorship and growing boldness has made terrorists increasingly
sophisticated and more likely to employ weapons of mass
destruction.9 Second, the technology and know-how involved in
building a nuclear weapon have become readily available."0 Third,
the abysmal state of affairs in Russia and the proliferation of nuclear
weapons to other countries have increased accessibility to fissile
materials, operable weapons, and skilled personnel.11 Finally, the
potential anonymity of nuclear terrorism and the increasing number
of nuclear-capable states have made the threat of retaliation less of a
deterrent.1
The threat is growing and the United States seems to have few
solutions. Consider this exchange from a 1993 Pentagon news
conference:
[Reporter]: What is to prevent some country, a Ghadafi or some
other crazy, from sticking a nuclear weapon in a container or the
hold of a merchant ship? How do you possibly counter against
that?

5. Delivering a nuclear weapon by hand is both technically simpler than missile or bomb
delivery and much more anonymous.
6. See JAMES DUNNIGAN & AUSTIN BAY, A QUICK AND DIRTY GUIDE TO WAR 41
(1996).
7. See JOHN MCPHEE, THE CURVE OF BINDING ENERGY 226 (1973) (quoting Theodore
B. Taylor).
8. See Karl-Heinz Kamp, An Overrated Nightmare, BULL. OF THE ATOM. SCIENTISTS,
July-Aug. 1996, at 30.

9.
10.
11.
12.

See discussion infra p. 110.
See discussion infra p. 92.
See discussion infra pp. 97, 102.
See discussion infra pp. 111, 128.
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[Lieutenant General Barry] McCaffrey: We don't have the answers

yet, but rest assured, that's one of our principal questions.13
In fact, there may be no ideal solution, but advances in
technology, changes in policy, and a more aggressive posture can at
least reduce the chances that the United States will fall victim to
nuclear terrorists. Rebuilding a credible deterrent is among the best
options. If the United States works to stem nuclear proliferation,
secure Russia's stockpiles, craft a flexible deterrence policy, and
develop new technologies to detect and trace nuclear materials, there
may be a chance. Changes must be made, and fast, because the
threat will only get worse as more countries develop nuclear weapons
and more materials leak out of former Soviet Republics."4
II. THE THREAT: WHO WOULD DO SUCH A THING?
Consider a fictional scenario to focus the problem. America
wakes up to CNN reports that a low-yield nuclear device has been
detonated in lower Manhattan. The World Trade Center, the Empire
State Building, and Wall Street have been vaporized. The immediate
death toll is well over a million, and more will die from radiation and
fallout. A long-term increase in incidences of cancer will add to the
carnage.
Analysis of the blast area and traces of fissile material reveal
that the weapon was of Russian origin. Cooperation from duly
concerned Moscow authorities reveals that the weapon was
misappropriated from the Arzamas weapons laboratory. However,
further investigation fails to reveal the thief (or perhaps buyer).
Several questions present themselves. First, who is responsible?
Against whom does the United States retaliate, and in what fashion?
Does the attacker have additional devices? Are more attacks
forthcoming?
Then, there is the question of motive. Suppose that the
perpetrator was Hizballah, acting on orders from Tehran. Consider
that Iran and its terrorist proxy might seek to 1) rid the Middle East
of Western cultural and political influences; 2) banish U.S. military
assets from the region; 3) destroy Israel as a state (which would be
13. Department of Defense News Briefing, conducted by Secretary of Defense Les Aspin,

Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Security and Counterproliferation Ashton B. Carter, and
Lieutenant General Barry McCaffrey, Director for Strategic Plans and Policy for the Joint

Chiefs of Staff (Oct. 29,1993) (transcript available from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense (Public Affairs)).

14. See discussion infra pp. 100, 102.
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easier if Israel's largest benefactor were wounded); or 4) curtail
America's ability to interfere in Iran's economic, political or military
expansion.' Because Iran lacks the capability to get its way by
conventional means, it resorts to terror. But kidnappings, bombings
and assassinations have not really solved Iran's problems, and war is
not an option. Indeed, U.S. military performance in Desert Storm
gave the mullahs nightmares, as it took the United States only six
weeks to do what Iran could not accomplish in nine years of war with
Baghdad.
Further, Iran does not fear retaliation, as the United States does
not know who is responsible. Iran need not claim responsibility or
issue threats in order to reap the reward of a hobbled America. Even
it did, would the attack invite nuclear retaliation? Conventional
force? Either would be difficult if Hizballah declared that it had
nuclear devices hidden in other U.S. cities and was ready to use them
in the event the United States moved against Iran.
So, before considering how terrorists can build or acquire
nuclear weapons, the topic of terrorism itself must be addressed.
More specifically, who might be likely to instigate an act of nuclear
terror? The temptation to equate capabilities with intent must be
avoided. Still, given the changing nature of terrorism and the recent
activities of various groups, the prospects for nuclear terrorism are on
the rise.
State sponsorship-in the form of equipment, funding, training
and safe havens-provides a significant contribution to the
sophistication of terrorist attacks. Currently, seven countries are
listed by the U.S. State Department as sponsors of terrorism: Cuba,
Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria. 6 Note that the
overlap between terrorism sponsors and nuclear proliferators is quite
strong. Of the above states, all but Cuba and Sudan are heavily
involved in suspicious nuclear activity.17 Given Castro's behavior
during the Cuban Missile Crisis and Havana's current lack of a
superpower sponsor, one might speculate that, had he adequate
15. For a brief discussion of the Iranian perspective toward the United States, see
SHAHRAM CHUBIN, IRAN's NATIONAL SECURITY PoLIcY 3-6 (1994).
16. See COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PUB. No.

10321, PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM 1995, at 23 (1996). As it turns out, East Germany
and other Soviet Bloc countries were heavily involved in training terrorists for attacks against
the West, but these operations were discontinued after the Berlin Wall fell in 1989. See COUNT
DE MARENCHES & DAvID A. ANDELMAN, THE FOURTH WORLD WAR 187 (1992).

17. Or rather, no evidence of such programs in Cuba or Sudan is publicly known. See
discussioninfra p. 97.
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resources, Castro might even now be engaged in a covert weapons
program (if only to use as leverage with the United States in easing
trade sanctions)."8
Terrorist groups sponsored by these states are high on the list of
likely nuclear users." The first and most formidable obstacle in
engaging in nuclear terror is the acquisition of fissile material or a
working weapon. One possible route is for a nuclear-capable state to
supply the weapon. Iran, for example, could produce a weapon,
transfer it to Hizballah, and suggest delivery to Tel Aviv,
Washington, or New York. Of course, Iranian operatives could
conduct the delivery themselves, but the Iranian government might
wish to distance itself from the attack. In the event the target country
determines that the bomb was of Iranian origin, Tehran could claim it
was stolen.
This scenario highlights an important component in the link
between proliferation and state-sponsored terrorism---enmity toward
the United States. Each of the aforementioned countries has reason
to harbor ill will toward America. Iraq may seek revenge for the
21
Gulf War, 2° as may Libya for the 1986 "Eldorado Canyon" bombing.
Iran has also skirmished with the U.S. military and sees the United
States as a harmful influence in the Middle East.' Syria resents U.S.
backing for Israel and the 1983 intervention in Lebanon.' North
Korea (which may already be nuclear-capable)24 certainly has not
forgotten U.S. involvement in the war that divided Korea forty-three
years ago, and sees America as the barrier between its forces and
Seoul. Any one of these countries would benefit if the world's only
remaining superpower were crippled by a nuclear attack, and might
even help to do it. Consider the following brief list of state-

18. This is not farfetched, as Castro wanted to launch against the United States during the
Cuban Missile Crisis, and such a plan seems to be working for North Korea. In addition, Cuba
has failed to sign the Treaty of Tlateloco, which seeks to create a nuclear weapons-free zone in
Latin America. See John R. Redick, Latin America's Emerging Non-Proliferation Consensus,
ARMS CONTROL TODAY, Mar. 1994, at 3.

19. Terrorists who enjoy the backing of a proliferator are in a good position to pursue
nuclear terror.
20. See, e.g., DUNNIGAN & BAY, supra note 6, at 62,76.
21. See id. at 309. Libya is likely infuriated by stiff sanctions imposed by the United
Nations in 1992 after Libya refused to turn over two of its intelligence officers who are
suspected of bombing Pan Am Flight 103. See id.
22. See CHUBrN, supra note 15, at 3-6.
23. See DUNNIGAN & BAY, supra note 6, at 102, 117.
24. See discussion infra p. 100.
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sponsored activities?'
Iran: Bombing of Beirut Marine barracks (1983), and U.S.
embassy (1984); hostage-taking in Lebanon throughout the 1980s;
death sentence (fatwa) issued against author Salman Rushdie;
Iraq: Attempt to assassinate former President George Bush
(1993);
Libya: Bombings of Pan Am flight 103 (1988) and UTA flight
772 (1989);
North Korea: Assassination of four South Korean cabinet
members in Rangoon bombing (1983); bombing of KAL aircraft
(1987);
Sudan: Assassination attempt against Egyptian President Hosni
Mubarak (1995); provision of training and safe havens for Abu Nidal
Organization, Hizballah, HAMAS, and others; and
Syria: Safe haven for HAMAS, Japanese Red Army, Popular
Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command, and
others0
These and other incidents indicate that sponsors of terrorism are
not averse to mass murder and might not have any qualms about
using weapons of mass destruction.' Indeed, these countries may see
the United States and its allies as lacking resolve, given that many of
the aforementioned incidents went unpunished.'
Given both state sponsorship and their own activities, many
subnational actors could have access to the funds, technology, and
know-how sufficient to build atomic weapons. Consider that the
Aum Shinrikyo cult, which manufactured its own sarin, 9 had one3
billion dollars in assets and fifty thousand converts worldwide.
Terrorism experts would consider the Aum Shinrikyo attack
significant as it relates to potential nuclear terrorism, because once
25. Of course, the list of incidents is much more extensive. Those included are the most
well known and best documented.
26. See generally COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM, supra note 16, at 23-28, 48-

49.
27. Note that Iraq has used chemical weapons (nerve agents and mustard gas) against
civilian targets already For example, several Kurdish villages were hit in 1988. See DUNNIGAN
& BAY, supra note 6, at 13.
28. See discussion on the changing nature of terror, infra p. 108.
29. Sain is a G-series nerve agent (dispersed by aerosol and absorbed by the skin, eyes,
and respiratory tract) that causes respiratory paralysis and death. See KATHLEEN C. BAILEY,

DOOMSDAY WEAPONS INTHE HANDS OF MANY 54 (1991).
30. See William J. Broad, Seismic Mystery in Australia: Quake, Meteor, or Nuclear Blast?,

N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 1997, at C1.
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an organization crosses the threshold into weapons of mass
destruction, others are more likely to follow suit." As terrorism
authority Brian Jenkins noted, "[A]n incident of nuclear terrorism,
perhaps even an alarming hoax, would almost certainly increase the
probability of other terrorists going nuclear." '
Several organizations could be candidates for nuclear terrorism,
many of which are Middle Eastern. Indeed, in the post-Cold War
era, Middle Eastern actors are often portrayed as most likely to
resort to nuclear weapons, in part due to the fatalistic views prevalent
in fundamentalist Islam3
The following groups were chosen for inclusion as examples
because they are large, currently active, have a record of
indiscriminate killing, and receive some sort of state sponsorship:
Abu Nidal Organization (ANO): A splinter group of the
Palestinian Liberation Organization founded by Abu Nidal, n6 Sabri
al-Banna. With a list of some nine hundred victims and a record of
mass killings, ANO boasts several hundred members, support from
the Iraqi, Libyan, and Sudanese governments, and its targets include
the United States.'
The Bosnian Serbs: Not a terrorist group per se, though they
have a record of genocide. The Bosnian Serbs are angry at the
United States for imposing the Dayton accords, helping to arrest war
criminals, and stationing troops in Bosnia. In 1995, Bosnian Serb
leader Radovan Karadzic paid $6 million for what he thought was a
nuclear weapon, with another $60 million promised to the arms
suppliers. Fortunately for everyone else, the nuclear weapon was a
fake, but the incident proves that the Bosnian Serbs were (and
perhaps still are) in the market for a nuclear weapon.'
31. See Gavin Cameron, Nuclear Terrorism: A Real Threat?, 8 JANE'S INTELLIGENCE

REV. 422,425 (1996).
32. Brian Jenkins, Will Terrorists Go Nuclear?, in THE TERRORISM READER 350, 355
(Waiter Laqueur & Yonah Alexander eds., 1987).
33. See DUNNIGAN & BAY, supra note 6, at 119. See also John F. Sopko, The Changing
ProliferationThreat, FOREIGN POL'Y, Dec. 1996, at 3, 11 (noting that "[R]eligious... groups
have become more aggressive in seeking to further their aims by using weapons that cause
large-scale casualties."). Note that some fundamentalist groups of the Jewish, Christian, and
Hindu faiths also have records of horrific and indiscriminate violence. However, most of the
state sponsors are Middle Eastern, and a large proportion of terrorist organizations listed by
the State Department are motivated by Islamic fundamentalism of one sort or another. See
generally COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM, supranote 16,41-67.
34. See generally COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM, supra note 16, at 41.
35. See Chris Hedges, An Old Tale of Swindle Resurfaces in Bosnia, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14,
1997, at A5.
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HAMAS: Formed in 1987 in the cauldron of the Intifadah,
HAMAS opposes reconciliation with Israel and has conducted
numerous bombings and assassinations.
With thousands of
sympathizers and a sophisticated financial network which includes
fundraising in the United States, aid from Iran, and contributions
from wealthy individuals in Saudi Arabia, HAMAS could go
nuclear."
Hizballah: An Iranian backed and, indeed, controlled group of
several thousand based in Lebanon, Hizballah (which operates
under numerous names to sow confusion) has an annual Tehransupplied budget of $80 million.' Hizballah is most infamous for the
1983 bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut and the
kidnapping of Westerners in Lebanon. 9 More recently, Hizballah is
suspected in the 1994 truck bombing of the Jewish cultural center in
Buenos Aires,' indicating the group has a wide reach.
Just because other terrorist groups do not show up on the State
Department list does not mean additional threats are absent. One
would suspect that a well-organized terrorist group, cell or splinter
faction could escape the notice of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
and other intelligence agencies. This would be especially true for an
organization formed explicitly to conduct an act of nuclear terrorism.
Perhaps the group would only surface once it had an operable device
and was ready to strike.
Another possible initiator of nuclear terrorism could be a
disgruntled Russian nationalist group, perhaps seeking revenge
against the United States for its role in the collapse of the Soviet
Empire, for helping the Mujahadin during the Afghan war, and for
the United States' recent attempts to push the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) further eastward. Such a group might consist
of members of the officer corps, who could easily have access to
nuclear materials, weapons, and access codes. Indeed, given that
the Russian military is poorly paid, lacks adequate housing, and
suffers low morale (in part due to the Chechnya fiasco), 2 the Russian

36. See generally COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM, supranote 16, at 25,46-47.

37. See generally id. at 48.
38. See Barton Gellman, West Pursues Terror Camp's Possible Link to Saudi Bombing of
U.S. Troops,WASH. POST, Dec. 1,1996, at A33.
39. See generally COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM, supranote 16, at 48.

40. See id. at 25.
41. See generally ANDREW & LESLE COcKBuRN, ONE POINT SAFE 32-46 (1997).
42. See generally id. Indeed, the Russian military is so strapped for cash that, in 1992,
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officer corps seems likely to be full of unhappy individuals.
Domestic terrorism is also a distinct and growing possibility.
The Oklahoma City bombing of 1995 killed 168 people.43 The
explosive was a crude device fabricated from a mixture of fertilizer
and fuel oil,' and the terrorists do not appear to have been either
very smart or very well organized. Consider what a better trained
and funded group with the same disregard for life might accomplish.
Elements of American militia groups have already been arrested for
working with ricin toxin, E. coli bacteria, salmonella, bubonic plague,
and nerve gas.45 If any of these groups could get their hands on fissile
materials (perhaps from civilian nuclear plants), then they might go
nuclear. What better way to destabilize a meddling and authoritarian
central government than by proving it cannot adequately protect its
own citizenry, thereby undermining public confidence?
A. The Changing Nature of Terror
At first glance, the terrorist modus operandi of using violence ,to
draw attention to a cause and gain sympathy for "the movement"
would not seem to mesh with nuclear use. While the threatof nuclear
attack is certainly an attention-getter, nuclear use would so horrify
people that few would sympathize with the cause or seek to redress
the alleged wrongs the terrorists were fighting. If, as Clausewitz
maintained, war is the continuation of politics by other means,46 then
terrorists would be unlikely to go so far out of bounds as to leave
politics behind. For example, the Irish Republican Army would not
resort to atomic terror as it would never again be brought into
political negotiations with London and would alienate most of its
supporters in Northern Ireland, along with its fund-raising base in the
United States.
Following this logic, terrorists might be divided into two subsets:
the traditional Clausewitzian terrorists seeking political change, and
the more extreme fanatics motivated by revenge, "end-is-near"
syndrome, or frustration with the progress achieved by current levels

General (and later Minister of Defense) Vladimir Rodionov turned his nuclear bomber unit

into an international freight and charter service. See id. at 35.
43. See Jo Thomas, After Two Years, Bombing Trial is Set to Begin, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30,
1997, § 1, at 1.
44. See id.
45. See David E. Kaplan, Terrorism'sNext Wave, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Nov. 17,
1997, at 24, 26.
46. CARL VON CLAUSEWrrZ, ON WAR 87 (Howard & Paret trans., 1984).
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of violence. Indeed, terrorists who have been practicing their trade
for a long time, confronted with a media-savvy population
desensitized to violence, may see nuclear terrorism as the only way to
keep the attention of a nation and achieve its goals.' This later
subset of terrorism seems to be on the rise.' Nuclear weapons allow
terrorists to go a step further: A terrorist with a nuclear weapon has a
military capability equivalent to that of an advanced sovereign state.
The changing nature of terrorism is of particular concern when
viewed in the nuclear context. A summary of terrorist activity from
1995, compiled by the U.S. State Department, indicates that the vast
majority of recent incidents have gone unclaimed. The refrain "no
one claimed responsibility for the attack" permeates the report,
which includes over eighty entries. 49 In an April 1995 study on trends
in terrorism, acting DDCI (Deputy Director Central Intelligence)
William Studeman observed that
[T]hese groups... are even more dangerous in some ways than the
traditional groups because they do not have a well-established
organizational identity and they tend to decentralize and
compartmentalize their activities. They also are capable of
producing and using more sophisticated conventional weaponry as
well as chemical and biological agents.
They are less
restrained.. .[and] appear disinclined to negotiate but, instead, seek
to take revenge on the USA and other Western countries by
inflicting heavy civilian casualties .... !4

More chilling from the nuclear standpoint, the new terrorists
"don't seem to care about establishing legitimacy but just want to
strike a blow in anger and kill as many people as possible ....

For

them, the calculation of the right level of violence seems to have no
upper bounds."'"
Recent terrorist activity has borne this out. In the cases of the
1993 World Trade Center Bombing, the 1994 bombing of the Jewish
Cultural Center in Buenos Aires, and the 1995 and 1996 attacks on
U.S. military facilities in Saudi Arabia, no group claimed
responsibility. 52 Each incident has been traced back to Middle
Eastern organizations,53 but in each case the perpetrators did not
47. See Jenkins, supra note 32, at 354.

48. See discussion infra p. 111 , 122-23.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

See generally COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM, supra note 16, at 29-40.
Cameron, supranote 31, at 424.
Id.
See generally COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM, supra note 16, at 23-28.
See id.
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seem interested in claiming credit, but rather with inflicting heavy
casualties and a dose of chaos.
With nuclear capability, terrorists might wish to make some
demands before inflicting harm. Four general demand schemes
suggest themselves: (1) bringing down a leader or government,
possibly for revenge purposes; (2) an independence or autonomy
demand, which could involve Palestine, Chechnya, or some other
enclave; (3) release of prisoners; and (4) the typical ransom demand.'
Some might say that the move from high explosives to nuclear
weapons is a big stretch, but many groups have at least given it some
thought.'
In fact, terrorist threats on the nuclear front are not
unknown. A German terrorist once said that, with a nuclear weapon,
he could make the Chancellor of Germany dance on top of his desk
in front of the television cameras.5 6 Indeed, in 1977 several members
of the Baader-Meinhof gang attacked a U.S. military base in Giessen,
Germany in an attempt to abscond with tactical nuclear weapons.
In 1985, the Armenian Scientific Group warned that Turkey's largest
cities would be destroyed by three low-yield nuclear devices.' While
the threat's credibility was low, the group's intent may have been
more serious. After all, some one million Armenians were the
victims of Turkish genocide in the years after World War I." It is not
inconceivable that revenge-seeking Armenians would utilize weapons
of mass destruction in (belated) retaliation.'
In another instance, a raid on the Italian Red Brigade group in
1984 turned up documents on the possibility of stealing a tactical
nuclear weapon.61 The same organization had kidnapped American
General James Dozier and questioned him extensively on the
location of nuclear weapons in Europe.62 These and other groups
understand that a nuclear weapon allows a subnational actor to do
real damage to the United States. Indeed, a nuclear device detonated

54. See John Peter Goss, Is Nuclear Terrorism Plausible?-Responses, in NUCLEAR
TERRORISM 39,42 (Paul Leventhal & Yonah Alexander eds., 1986).

55. To some groups, a nuclear weapon may just be a more powerful bomb.
56. See Jenkins, supranote 32, at 352.

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

See COCKBURN, supranote 41, at 1-6.
See Jenkins, supranote 32, at 352 (citing NIARMARA (Istanbul), Jan. 14, 1985).
See id.
See id.
See Thomas D. Davies, What Nuclear Means and Targets Might Terrorists Find

Attractive?, in NUCLEAR TERRORISM 54,57 (Paul Leventhal & Yonah Alexander eds., 1986).

62. See id.
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in Washington, D.C. or New York could cripple the country.' So
nuclear use is on the terrorist option list. In order to strike, however,
terrorists must be able to deliver their device to the target.
B. Special Delivery-Getting the Bomb to the Target
Terrorists would have a wide variety of options for delivering an
atomic device to the United States and into a target city. They could
use a ship-perhaps a fishing trawler, a freighter or a yacht. They
could come in overland from Mexico or Canada. They could use an
aircraft or a helicopter. In fact, given the tidal wave of illegal
immigrants and drugs flowing into the United States on a daily
basis,' it is not inconceivable that a terrorist group could smuggle an
atom bomb into the country, especially if it were shielded from
detection. Indeed, a major obstacle in dealing with a threatened act
of nuclear terror is finding the device."
Security in the United States is less than stellar. America
maintains 301 official ports of entry, and only ten thousand customs
inspectors are assigned to cover those ports, which translates into
about thirty inspectors per port." None of these inspectors is
presently trained or equipped to detect nuclear materials. 7
Complicating the problem, the volume of people and cargo entering
the country is staggering. Each day, 1.25 million people enter the
United States.' Given the sheer volume of traffic and the country's
inability to stem illegal immigration, it is likely that terrorists could
slip into the United States with little difficulty.69 For example,
convicted terrorist ringleader Sheik Abdel Rahman had no problems
getting into the country despite the fact that he came in from Sudan
and was on a CIA watchlist. 70
63. A well-timed attack on the District could incapacitate the American government and
the military. A strike on New York would likely throw the world financial markets into
unprecedented turmoil.

64. See GRAHAMT. ALLISON ETAL, AVOIDING NuCLEAR ANARCHY 66 n.34 (1996).
65. See Albert Camesale, Defenses Against New Nuclear Threats, in NEW NUCLEAR
NATIONS 196,204 (Robert D. Blackwill & Albert Carnesale eds., 1993).
66. See ALLISONET AL, supranote 64, at 65.

67. See id.
68. See id.
69. Alternatively, terrorists or state sponsors could use "sleeper agents" already in place
and fully integrated into the local community. The sleeper functions as a normal member of
the community, possibly for years, until called upon to engage in espionage or terrorist activity.
See Susan M Schreck, The Accidental Terrorists: Excludable Aliens Who Slip Across U.S.
Borders, 23 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L., 625,639 (1993).
70. The problem is even harder if terrorists have forged identity documents.
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Cargo is even more problematic. On any given day, 1.36 billion
kilograms of cargo arrive from overseas by ship, with another 4.66
million kilograms by aircraft.' Less than five percent of that cargo is
physically inspected, and even then the inspection takes place after
the cargo has already arrived at a port in or near a major city.' If a
nuclear bomb is on the docks in Miami, New York, or San Francisco,
it is already too late. Worse, terrorists do not have to infiltrate at one
of these official entry ports. Indeed, smart terrorists may not even
bother using official channels of commerce. Perhaps the bomb could
be broken down into its component parts and reassembled at the
target. Terrorists might even use the United Parcel Service, Federal
Express, or some other courier service.'
An example will serve to indicate just how easy it is to get a large
quantity of material into the country. In June of 1995, seven tons of
zirconium, a metal used to clad nuclear reactor fuel, were shipped
from Ukraine to the United States, and from there the shipment was
supposed to go to Iraq.74 Five tons were subsequently discovered 7at
a
5
warehouse in Queens (the other two tons apparently "got away").
Seven tons of contraband. A quantity of plutonium sufficient to
build a crude atomic weapon would be about the size of an apple. 6 If
customs cannot find plastic bags full of white powder with adequate
frequency, will they be able to spot a piece of metal the size of an
apple? Hidden amongst 1.36 billion kilos of cargo?
Screening for radiation will not be of much use. It is true that
some materials can be detected at ranges up to three hundred feet,
but only if they are "unshielded."7 Any smart terrorist will use lead
shielding78 to foil detection. Highly enriched uranium (HEU)71 is
even harder to pick up, and even the most sophisticated passive
71. See ALLISONET AL, supra note 64, at 65.

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

See ihL
See id. at 69.
See id. at 65.
See id.
See id.
at 68.
See id.
at 67.

78. See i.

Shielding refers to cladding nuclear materials in lead or other heavy metals to

prevent radioactivity (alpha, beta, or gamma particles) from escaping and either 1) harming
people or 2) being detected by geiger counters or other radiation sensors. See id.
79. Bombs may not be efficiently crafted from the naturally occurring U-238 isotope. See
Barry Kellman & David S. Gualtieri, BarricadingThe Nuclear Window-A Legal Regime To

Curtail Nuclear Smuggling, 1996 U. ILL L. REV. 667, 693 (1996). Uranium must therefore be
enriched by separating out the scarce U-235 and increasing its overall ratio. HEU contains

20% or more of U-235. See id.

92

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 8:79

detectors only work from a few feet away.8' With shielding, HEU will
escape detection.'
Active sensors which bombard HEU with
radiation are more effective, but such detectors are dangerous to
operate around humans and would be unsuitable at ports of entry for
that reason. '
III. THE THREAT: ACQUIRING THE BOMB
Consider another scenario. Suppose a terrorist group were to
purchase weapons-grade uranium from the Sverdlovsk uranium
enrichment and weapons assembly facility in Russia. People at
Sverdlovsk have a going rate for each aspect of the transaction,
having done this sort of thing before for some North Korean
customers. Security is better since the facility received Nunn-Lugar '
funding, but if the sale is an inside job run by people with access
codes and knowledge of the security protocols, well, things do get lost
in the shuffle. Why? Because the officials at Sverdlovsk are poor.
They do not get paid regularly. When they do, the check is below
subsistence levels. And they always ask where the bomb will be used.
If the target is the United States, so much the better. Officers may
blame the United States for the loss of their empire and their low
standard of living.
The uranium, about the size of a baseball, is transported to a
makeshift lab where a few unemployed Russian weapons designers
help to build a crude fission device. The device is loaded on an old
freighter which regularly carries cargo to San Francisco. U.S.
intelligence has been following leaks from Sverdlovsk, but has been
unable to trace fissile material thefts to the perpetrators; keeping
track of Pacific rim ocean traffic, even with a sophisticated satellite
system, is no easy task. Therefore, when the old freighter pulls up to
port, it is not challenged by the Coast Guard. And then the package
hidden away in the cargo hold goes off.

80. See ALLISON ET AL, supra note 64, at 67.

81. See id.
82. See id
83. The Nunn-Lugar legislation has allocated over $1.5 billion to assist former Soviet
republics in safely dismantling, transporting, and protecting nuclear weapons. See National

Defense Authorization Act For Fiscal Year 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-106, §1201, 110 Stat. 186, 469
(1996).
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A. The Basics of Bomb Building
The critical component to any nuclear plot is the hardware.'
Generally, either uranium (U-235) or plutonium (Pu-239) is required
to fabricate a nuclear weapon.
The Natural Resources Defense
recently
estimated
that
a
one-kiloton weapon could be
Council
fashioned from 2.5 to 8 kilograms of fissile material." Indeed, a
bomb could probably be constructed from just one kilogram;' if the
goal is to build a radiological dispersion device," even less material
might do." But a nuclear bomb with such a small fissile core is
extremely sophisticated' and could only be fabricated by the United
States or a comparably-equipped country.91 For a less-advanced
design, perhaps 15 to 25 kilograms would be needed.'
Enriched materials are not even required to build a nuclear
weapon. A bomb can be fashioned from reactor- (as opposed to
weapons-) grade plutonium, though the task is more technically
challenging.' Indeed, in 1962 the Department of Defense set off a 20
kiloton bomb made of reactor-grade plutonium to determine if such a
feat were possible. 5 The United States and other important nuclear
In
powers use weapons-grade material because it is reliable.'
84. See Kellman & Gualtieri, supranote 79, at 683.
85. Plutonium is the most efficient material used in nuclear weapons, as it has the lowest
critical mass. Though Pu-239 is preferred, all plutonium isotopes are fissionable except
plutonium which is more than 80% Pu-238. See id. at 683 n.49.
86. See David Hughes, UraniumSeizures Heighten Terrorism Concerns,AVIATION WK. &
SPACE TECH., Apr. 3, 1995, at 63.
87. The quantity of material needed to achieve critical mass is largely dependent on how
highly enriched the material is. For example, using uranium that was 20% enriched, a bomb
maker would need about 250 kg. Using uranium that was 90% enriched, a bomb maker would
need about 18 kg. See Kellman & Gualtieri, supranote 79, at 684.
88. A radiological dispersion device is a conventional bomb which is "larded with deadly
radioactive shrapnel" that scatters across a wide area upon detonation. See Douglas Wailer,
NuclearNinjas,TIME, Jan. 8, 1996, at 38,40.
89. See discussion infra Part IUF.
90. See Owen R. Cot6, Jr., A Primeron FissileMaterialsand Nuclear Weapons Design, in
GRAHAM T. ALLIsON ET AL., AVOIDING NuCLEAR ANARCHY 203, app. B, at 207 (1996).
91. Indeed, some of America's thermonuclear warheads use only nine pounds of
plutonium. See Id.
92. See Hughes, supranote 86, at 63.
93. See Cot6, supranote 90, at 217.
94. The Department of Defense classifies plutonium as supergrade (97% Pu-239), weapon
grade (93% Pu-239), fuel grade (at least 80% Pu-239), and reactor grade (less than 80% Pu239). See Kellman & Gualtieri, supra note 79, at 683 n.49.
95. See David Hughes, When Terrorists Go Nuclear, POPULAR MECHANICS, Jan. 1996, at
56,58.
96. See Cotd, supranote 90, at 205.
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addition, much less of it is needed for critical mass,' which is an
important characteristic when building ballistic missile warheads'
with limited payload weights. 9 However, a terrorist with limited
resources would probably not mind if his bomb is substantially
heavier than bombs made with weapons-grade materials, or even if
his bomb "fizzled,"" and thus yielded only a two-kiloton blast
instead of twenty.'
One myth surrounding nuclear materials is that they are difficult
to transport, because of their heavy weight and radioactivity."7
However, this is not the case. The Hiroshima bomb, built over fifty
years ago, used about one hundred pounds of highly-enriched
uranium (HEU).' A more sophisticated weapon might require only
forty pounds of HIEU, or twenty pounds of plutonium."4 Such low
weights can be carried by a single person, and since uranium and
plutonium are among the densest materials known to man, 7 the
package would hardly be cumbersome. Indeed, 100 pounds of HEU
would be about the size of a grapefruit.' 6 In addition, radiation is not
a big problem; Pu-239 only emits alpha particles, which cannot
penetrate the skin,' while HEU is even less radioactive. l"
Still, manpower is at issue. Carson Mark, former head of nuclear
weapons development at Los Alamos, 9 believes that a dozen

97. See id.
at 206.
98. See Carey Sublette, NIILNET-Nuclear Weapons, 4.2.6.1,4.5.1.2. (fast modified Oct. 23,

1996) <http://www.onestep.com/milnet/nukeweap>. This is an excellent web site for all aspects
of nuclear weapons, including the science behind bomb building, current nuclear arsenal

compositions and proliferation trends.
99. See id.
100. See ALLISON ET AL, supra note 64, at 61. A fizzle is akin to a dud, but whereas a dud
fails to detonate altogether, a fizzle means that the nuclear device failed to perform at its

predicted yield. Thus, a twenty-kiloton bomb that fizzled might only produce a two-kiloton
blast, but is obviously still cause for concern. Id.
101. See Cot6,supra note 90, at 217.
102. See ALLISONETAL., supranote 64, at 12.
103. See id.
104. For example, the Nagasaki bomb contained 12 pounds of plutonium. See Cot6, supra note
90, at 206.
105. Indeed, the U.S. military uses depleted (non-radioactive) uranium to armor tanks and

for armor-piercing ammunition. See MIKE SpicK, MODERN ATrAcK AIRCRAFr 87 (1987).
106. See ALLISON Er AL., supra note 64, at 1.
107. However, if ingested, plutonium is one of the most toxic of all substances. See
Kellman & Gualtieri, supra note 79, at 683 n.49.
108. See ALLISON Er AL., supranote 64, at 12.

109. The Los Alamos nuclear weapons lab is in New Mexico. See 96 COLUM. L. REv. 1203,
1226 n.134 (1996).
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specialists-including a nuclear physicist, a mechanical engineer, a
chemist, an explosives expert, and a mathematician--could build a
nuclear weapon in one year."' The scenario assumes that the group
has an adequate supply of plutonium or highly enriched uranium.
The specialists would need to be highly skilled, but not necessarily
experienced in nuclear weapons design.'
The process would
probably be faster if actual weapons designers, from Russia perhaps,
were employed.
Any nuclear weapons design team would have access to a
tremendous amount of sophisticated equipment and information
available on the open market." Nuclear weapons are simply easier
to build than they used to be." The United States began the
Manhattan Project" 4 in 1942, over fifty years ago. Today, vast
amounts of information on physics, chemistry, and engineering are
available to the general population, and increasing numbers of
students are learning about these subjects.1 '
On the positive side, a home-made terrorist weapon would
probably be a simple fission bomb."6 The much more destructive
thermonuclear designs"7 are more difficult and expensive to
construct.118 Thermonuclear weapons require deuterium, tritium, and
lithium deuteride to enable the fusion process which can produce
explosive yields in the megaton range."' These isotopes are very
difficult and expensive to create, do not travel well, and are hard to
store (due to short half-lives)." Thermonuclear weapons are not
beyond the capabilities of terrorists, but a simple twenty kiloton
110. See Hughes, supranote 86.
111. See id. at 64.
112. See id.
113. See id, see also KATHLEEN C. BAILEY, DOOMSDAY WEAPONS IN THE HANDS OF

MANY 15 (1991) (explaining that nuclear weapons are easier to design today than in 1942
because of several factors, including the abundance of information regarding the nuclear U.S.
program, the existence of several sources for equipment and materials, and the increased
familiarity with nuclear technology from civil nuclear programs).
114. The Manhattan Project was the code name of America's atom bomb program during
World War 11. See M. Christina Ramirez, The Balance of Interests Between National Security
Controls and First-Amendment Interests in Academic Freedom, 13 J.C. & U.L. 179, 198 n.156
(1986).
115. See id.
116. See Sublette, supranote 98, at 4.2.1,4.2.6.2.
117. Thermonuclear weapons can produce explosive yields in the megaton range (one
megaton equals one million tons of TNT).
118. See Cot6, supra note 90, at 208.
119. See id.
120. See Sublette, supra note 98, at 2.2.2.1,2.2.2.2.
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fission bomb is much easier and cheaper to construct. 1 However, as
a compromise, terrorists could create a "boosted" fission weapon,
which would use some of the elements involved in a thermonuclear
design to increase the yield of a fission bomb."
Some argue that nuclear weapons design is an arcane and
esoteric art. If nuclear weapons are so easy to build, why is it that
more countries do not have them? First, many countries could build
nuclear weapons but have chosen not to, either because they did not
want to take the big step into nuclear status, they were pressured by
allies, or they decided that the U.S. nuclear umbrella was a cheaper
alternative.' Argentina, Brazil, Sweden, Switzerland, South Korea
and Taiwan all engaged in nuclear weapons programs at some point,
but eventually gave up for one or more of the aforementioned
reasons.' 4 Japan, Germany, and most of Europe have the capacity to
build bombs, but again choose not to.m
The hard part of nuclear weapons construction is not bomb
building, but fissile-material enrichment.' Creating U-235 or Pu-239
from naturally occurring or reactor-grade materials requires a
complicated and expensive enrichment process.w It is this process
which has given countries like Iraq so much trouble." If a country or
terrorist group can acquire the fissile material, then the enrichment
process is moot. But when a proliferator wants a completely
indigenous, self-sustaining system with which to build a nuclear
arsenal, the enrichment process is crucial and hard to develop in
secret.m9 That is not to say that such a system is impossible; had Iraq
not invaded Kuwait, it might well have several bombs right now.
Indeed, Lieutenant General Hussein Kamel Majid, former head of
Iraq's weapon procurement program, recently revealed that just
before the Gulf War, Iraq initiated a crash program to manufacture a
single nuclear weapon by the spring of 1991.1' Iraq had a total of 45
121.
122.
123.
124.

See id' at 4.2.6.2.
See Cot6, supranote 90, at 208-11.
See BAILEY, supra note 113, at 33.
See Sublette, supra note 98, at 7.4.

125. See id at 7.5.
126. See id at 4.2.1.

127. U-235 is very rare in nature, while Pu-239 is not a naturally occurring isotope. See
BAILEY, supra note 113, at 10. To get quantities sufficient for a bomb thus requires the
enrichment of naturally occurring isotopes. See Cotd, supranote 90, at 212.
128. See BAILEY, supra note 113, at 9-13.
129. See id. at 10-11.
130. See Sublette, supranote 98, at 7.4.3.
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kilograms of weapons-grade uranium ready for processing, but the
scheme was aborted due to the allied air campaign which began in
January of 1991.13
Additionally, proliferators do not want to rush the construction
of a single bomb and then try to use it. If the plot goes wrong,
retaliation will be hard to deter.'32 A country that develops an
indigenous nuclear program has a more ambiguous stance and deters
military action by other countries (like the United States), which may
be uncertain as to how advanced the program is and how many
bombs have been or can be built. Officials in Washington may
hesitate to bomb North Korean facilities partly for this reason.133
B. Prolific Proliferation
Since the United States completed the Manhattan Project, other
countries have struggled to develop their own atomic arsenals.
Officially, only Russia, Britain, France, and China have been
While Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan did inherit
successful."
strategic and tactical nuclear assets following the dissolution of the
Soviet empire, all of those assets have now supposedly been
transferred back to Russia.
The reality of nuclear proliferation is much more troubling. A
thorough examination of proliferation illustrates just how far nuclear
technology has spread. Further, proliferators themselves may supply
bombs or fissile materials to terrorists either intentionally, through
loss or theft, or by way of corrupt insiders.
On the positive side, several countries have at least temporarily
abandoned the nuclear option.'36 Taiwan, Sweden, and South Korea
have all pursued the nuclear option at one time or another, but their
programs are now thought to be inactive.3 South Africa successfully
built seven nuclear weapons, but turned them over to the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1993 and

131. See id.
132. If the target knows that the proliferator only had one operable weapon, and that

weapon has been discovered or disabled, then no uncertainty exists about additional nuclear
threats.

133. Bombing an operating nuclear plant also creates a risk of dispersing radioactive
fallout.

134.
135.
136.
137.

See Sublette, supranote 98, at 7.2.1-7.2.5.
See id. at 7.2.6.
See id.
See id.
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voluntarily dismantled the whole weapons project." Brazil139 and
Argentina14 have also apparently abandoned the quest for nuclear
weapons,14 while Operation Desert Storm supposedly crippled Iraq's
bomb project.142 Still, the list of nuclear powers is longer and more
ambiguous than would seem at first.
India's nuclear capability has been known since May 18, 1974,
when it detonated a fifteen kiloton bomb in the Rajasthan Desert.'43
India is now thought to have up to 100 nuclear weapons, which may
include second-generation (thermonuclear) bombs.'" Because India
is not a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)'4
(and is indeed a vociferous objector to the current nuclear regime),
India's nuclear facilities and stockpiles are not subject to monitoring
by the IAEA and are thus "unsafeguarded. '14
Israel became nuclear capable in the late 1960s, though its own
weapons development owes much to French assistance. 47 Israel is
believed to have anywhere from one hundred to three hundred
weapons," probably including thermonuclear capability. 49
On February 7, 1992, Pakistan's Foreign Minister, Shahryrar
Khan, told the Washington Post that his country had the components
to assemble nuclear weapons."' In July of 1993, General Mirza
Aslam Beg, former chief of staff of the Pakistani army, claimed that

138. See Lewis A. Dunn, New Nuclear Threats to U.S. Security, in NEW NUCLEAR NATIONS
21,37 (Robert D. Blackwill & Albert Carnesale eds., 1993).

139. See Sublette, supranote 98, at 7.4.2.
140. See id. at 7.4.1.
141. However, a 1995 report quoted Russian intelligence sources as saying that Brazil has
resumed its weapons program. See In Brief,JANE's DEF. WKLY., Vol. 23, No. 14, April 8,1995,
at 5.

142. See Sublette, supranote 98, at 7.43.
143. See id.
at 73.1.
144. See Dunn, supranote 138, at 36.
145. The Nuclear-Non Proliferation Treaty stipulates that only the five recognized nuclear
powers may have such weapons, but are obligated to move toward disarmament and assist
other signatories with peaceful nuclear programs (i.e. power, medicine, or research). States
receiving such assistance are obligated to undergo inspections by the International Atomic

Energy Agency to ensure that nothing is being used for military purposes. See Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1,1968,21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161.

146. See id. at 7.1, 7.3.
147. See id.
at 7.3.3.
148. See generally SEYMOUR HERSH, THE SAMPSON OPTION (1991) (stating that Israel
possesses three hundred weapons); see Dunn, supranote 138 (supporting the lower tally).
149. See Dunn, supra note 138.
150. See R. Jeffrey Smith, Pakistan Official Affirms Capcity for Nuclear Device; Foreign
Minister Vows to Contain Technology, WASH. POST, Feb. 7,1992, at Al.
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Pakistan had tested a nuclear device (probably a hydronuclear/zeroyield test"), and other officials have admitted that Pakistan has
fabricated pits (the nuclear core of an atom bomb) for fission
Pakistan is suspected of having at least ten airweapons.'
deliverable bombs. 153
Iraq effectively outsmarted the IAEA for years by doing the
unexpected.'
The IAEA safeguards program was designed to
monitor peaceful nuclear programs to ensure that no materials were
diverted to weapons use.' As far as the IAEA could tell, Iraq was a
model member of the regime in both compliance and cooperation. 56
Thus, Iraq's program was thought by many to have been unjustly
attacked in the 1981 Israeli air-strike on the Osirak nuclear facility.'
Osirak was a declared facility under IAEA safeguard, making Israel
the target of harsh international criticism.'7 However, the Israelis
feared that a weapons program was in progress.'59 Unfortunately, the
Osirak strike convinced the Iraqis of the need to better secure their
weapons facilities, which were dispersed and moved underground.'O
The IAEA would then be even less likely to stumble on the hidden
while Israel and others would be hard-pressed to destroy
program,
61
it.

1

Unbeknownst to the IAEA, the Iraqis had developed a secret
parallel program, separate from its declared and peaceful power and
research operations. The Iraqi weapons project, undetected by the
IAEA's limited intelligence capabilities, operated without any
safeguards or monitoring of any kind. An examination of Iraq's
weapons program conducted in the aftermath of Desert Storm
151. See Sublette, supranote 98, at 7.3.6.
152. See id.
153. See Dunn, supranote 138, at 36.
154. See Lawrence Sheinman, Lessons From Post-WarIraqfor the InternationalFull-Scope
Safeguards Regime, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, April 1993, at 3, 4. IAEA safeguards are
designed to catch states using declared fissile material for weapons purposes, not to ferret out
separate undeclared sites. See id.
155. See Paul Doty & Steven Flank, Arms Control for New Nuclear Nations, in NEW
NUCLEAR NATIONS 53, 54-55 (Robert D. Blackwill & Albert Carnesale eds., 1993).

156. See Sheinman, supranote 154, at 3-4.
157. See Dunn, supranote 138, at 23.
158. See SEYMOUR HERSH, THE SAMSON OPTION 9 (1991).
159. See id. at 10.
160. See Maurizio Zifferero, The IAEA: Neutralizing Iraq's Nuclear Weapons Potential,
ARMS CONTROL TODAY, April 1993, at 8.
161. As of December 1997, Iraq continues to defy the United Nations and the IAEA by
failing to cooperate with weapons inspectors.
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indicated that the Iraqis were within one year of completing a
working nuclear weapon, though of dubious safety and
sophistication.1 62
North Korea acceded to the NPT in 1985, but failed to sign the
IAEA safeguards arrangement until 1992. Even after having done
so, Pyongyang refused access to two undeclared nuclear facilities and
was criticized by the IAEA's Board of Governors. North Korea
retaliated by threatening to withdraw from the NPT and has renewed
that threat on several occasions. Though the North Koreans have
severely restricted IAEA inspection efforts, intelligence indicates
that they have enough material (somewhere between seven and
thirty-three kilograms of plutonium) to produce between one to five
weapons.1' 6 Further, eight thousand reactor rods now in a cooling
pond at the Yongbyon complex could be reprocessed to yield enough
material for an additional five weapons.16 A March 1993 report in
Germany's Stem magazine cited a KGB report which claimed that
North Korea produced its first nuclear warhead in 1991, using fiftysix kilograms of plutonium smuggled out of Russia1 6 North Korea
supposedly froze its weapons program in 1994, in exchange for fuel
oil and new light-water reactors" to be supplied by South Korea.
However, on November 15, 1996, Pyongyang declared it could no
longer abide by the freeze because the U.S. and South Korea were
"dragging their feet" on the new reactors. 67 The testimony of recent
defectors from the North further supports the notion that North
Korea is already a nuclear power.
Still more countries now seek the bomb. According to Lewis A.
Dunn, former assistant director of the U.S. Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency and ambassador to the 1985 NPT Review
Conference, Algeria, Egypt, Libya, and Syria could have working

162. On examining the Iraqi design, one U.N. inspector noted, "I wouldn't want to be
around if it fell off the edge of this desk." Gary Milhollin, Building Saddam Hussein's Bomb,
N.Y. TiMES, Mar. 8,1992, (Magazine), at 32.
163. See Dunn, supra note 138, at 37.
164. The rods are now under IABA supervision, but could be reprocessed if the IAEA is

kicked out. See, e.g., Howard Diamond, The Korea Deal: Advantage U.S., WASH. POST, Apr.
17, 1997, at A23.
165. See Seymour Hersh, The Wild East,ATLANTC MONTHLY, June 1994, at 75.
166. Light-water reactors are supposedly much harder to use for the nefarious purpose of
bomb-construction, though the task is not impossible. See Shim Jae Hoon, Nuclear Test: Can

Reactor HealNorth-South Rift?, FARE. ECON. REV., Sept. 4,1997, at 16.
167. North Korea Warms on Freeze, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Nov. 16-17,1996, at 4.
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nuclear devices by the turn of the century. "
While Libya only operates a ten-megawatt research reactor and
has apparently made little progress toward a nuclear capability,
Colonel Qaddafi has publicly stated an intent to build nuclear
weapons. 69 Additionally, Libya is suspected of hiring nuclear experts
from the former U.S.S.R., so progress may accelerate. The Colonel
would also like to purchase a weapon. Indeed, he tried to buy one
from China in 1970, and when denied Libya contributed millions of
dollars to Pakistan's program in the hopes of sharing in the results."'
Pakistan cut off the Libyans, but not before Qaddafi expedited
Pakistan's purchase of four hundred tons of uranium oxide from
Niger." Colonel Qaddafi then turned to India, which refused, and
was in turn punished when Libya cut off its seven million barrel per
annum oil deliveries.'
Of all the proliferators, Iran is the most feared. Estimates vary,
but Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu placed Iran between
three and five years from nuclear weapons status, 73 and that estimate
was made in 1996. Iran certainly has the capabilities. Aside from the
skilled personnel hired from former Soviet republics, China,' 4 and

Pakistan (as discussed infra), Iran has the physical plant to build
atomic weapons. Iran has its own uranium mine and processing plant
at Sighand, a uranium enrichment research facility at Isfahan, and in
just a few years will have several Russian and Chinese-built reactors
in the 300 and 440 megawatt range at Bushehr and Darkubin.'75
Russia has also agreed to provide two thousand tons of uranium as
well as assistance with the development of Iran's uranium mines,
though the United States has successfully blocked the planned sale of
a uranium-enrichment plant. 6

168. See Dunn, supranote 138, at 37.
169. See Sublette, supranote 98, at 7.3.
170. See Jeremiah Denton, International Terrorism-TheNuclear Dimension, in NUCLEAR
TERRORISM 154 (Paul Leventhal & Yonah Alexander eds., 1986).

171. See id. at 154.
172. See id.
173. See BENJAMINNETANYAHU, FIGHTING TERRORISM 121 (1995).
174. Indeed, in June of 1993 Iranian government sources confirmed that a Chinese nuclear

engineer and two Iranian technicians were kidnapped from the city of Shiraz. The men are
suspected of being involved in Iran's clandestine nuclear weapons program. The report
indicates that at least one country, perhaps Israel or Iraq, is on the case. See IranianNuclear
Secrets Can Be Dangerousto Your Health, TIME, July 4,1994, at 12.
175. See NETANYAHU, supranote 173, at 122.
176. See Sublette, supranote 98, at 7.3.
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Iran has also not been satisfied with its domestic assets. In 1992,
Iran attempted to purchase weapons-grade uranium from the Ulba
Metallurgical Plant in Kazakhstan, and continues to seek restricted
materials on the black market.' Anyone doubting Iran's intent need
only heed the words of then Vice President Sayed Ayatollah
Mohajerani, who in 1992 declared that "we, the Muslims, must
cooperate to produce an atomic bomb, regardless of UN efforts to
'
prevent proliferation."178
Finally, a broader proliferation problem presents itself. The
larger the nuclear "club," the greater the possibility that fissile
material, critical technology, or even an operable warhead will fall
into the wrong hands. Even the big five nuclear powers cannot be
counted on to completely safeguard nuclear assets, as seen in
Russia's case. But further problems may arise with states like
Pakistan and Iraq, where corruption is rampant, safeguard systems
are less than adequate, and experience with nuclear matters is
limited. The new proliferators simply do not have the experience,
resources or technology to create an American-style system which
would ensure that all nuclear assets are safe from unauthorized sale
or theft.17"9
C. Loose Nukes-The U.S.S.R.'s Going-Out-of-Business Sale
Perhaps nuclear terrorists do not enjoy the benefits of state
sponsorship. Perhaps they do not have access to fissile materials
from poorly-guarded commercial sources. Perhaps they lack the
expertise to fabricate a workable atomic device. There is another
option: securing a Russian nuclear weapon. Russian security is the
issue that has many experts asking when, not if, the United States will
be attacked with an unconventionally-delivered nuclear weapon."
First, a consideration of what is available is warranted. Russia's
arsenal, while having been cut under the Intermediate Nuclear Force
(INF) and Strategic Arms Reduction (START) treaties, is still quite
formidable, and now numbers somewhere between fifteen and
twenty five thousand weapons181 spread amongst nearly one hundred
177. See id. at 7.3; COCKBURN, supra note 41, at 174.

178. See Etel Solingen, The PoliticalEconomy of Nuclear Restraint, 19 INT'L SECURITY, 2,
at 126, 152.
179. See generally Steven E. Miller, Assistance to Newly Proliferating Nations, in NEW
NUCLEAR NATIONS 21, 37 (Robert D. Blackwill & Albert Carnesale eds., 1993), at 97.
180. See Rosenthal, supra note 3.
181. ALLISON ET AL, supra note 64, at 21. Russia maintains five types of Inter-Continental
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storage sites throughout Russia."s Russia's fissile material stores
include approximately two hundred tons of plutonium and between
eight and twelve hundred tons of HEU.1 " The dismantling process
mandated by START will increase the amount of fissile material in
circulation. Indeed, six tons of plutonium and thirty tons of uranium
will be removed from Russian warheads in the course of the next
fifteen years."l
While the former Soviet Union's entire nuclear arsenal is now
allegedly in Russia, several former Soviet republics maintain nuclear
facilities of interest. There is a nuclear warhead plant at Kurchatov
and a plutonium and uranium enrichment center at Krasnoyarsk-45,
both in Kazakhstan."' Other sites exist in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and
Ukraine. Altogether, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Ukraine still
account for 70 percent of the former Soviet Union's uranium
stockpiles."
Further, Russia maintains thirty-seven civil power reactors,
Ukraine has fourteen, and Lithuania and Armenia each have two."
Most are poorly supervised and the Russian Ministry of Atomic
Energy is grossly understaffed and under-funded."
The Russian
Northern Fleet, a security risk harbored on the Kola peninsula, had
its electricity cut off by the local power company for not paying its
bills, even though the nuclear vessels need a constant flow of power
to prevent overheating and meltdown."l Security is low and morale
amongst the soldiers is poor at best. Desertions in the Russian
military are common and the country currently faces a crisis because
soldiers are not receiving regular paychecks. For example, in 1993 a
Russian naval officer in Murmansk absconded with a 10-pound block
of enriched uranium, which he was planning to sell. The officer had
nothing more than a chain link fence and an ordinary locker standing

Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), ballistic and cruise missiles aboard submarines, as well as bombs
and cruise missiles for air launch. Many sources quote lower figures, around 9,500, but that
figure is solely for strategic assets, not including tactical weapons such as artillery shells, shortrange missiles, mines, etc. See, e.g., Sublette, supranote 98, at 7.4.
182. See Sublette, supranote 98, at 7.4.
183. See ALLISON ET AL, supranote 64, at 21.
184. See How to Steal an Atom Bomb, T1E ECONOMIST, June 5,1993, at 15.
185. See Mark Galeotti, Decline and Fall-RussianBombs and Global Security, 6 JANE'S
INTELLIGENCE REVIEW 434 (1994).
186. See id. at 434.
187. See id.
188. See id.
189. See Cameron, supra note 31, at 422.
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between himself and the uranium. 190
Even more troubling, since Russia reabsorbed the Soviet arsenal
by claiming weapons and material from Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and
Belarus, there is a sixty to seventy percent overloading of Russian
storage facilities and monitoring systems.191 Confusion is rampant,
and reports persist, though denied by the Russian Defense Ministry,
that twenty-three warheads were lost from a depot in Komsomolskna-Amure in March of 1992."9 The problem is exacerbated by the
inadequacies of Russia's material protection, control and accounting
system. The Russians simply do not have a good idea of how much
nuclear material and weaponry they have, where it all is, and whether
anything is missing."
The scope of the problem is staggering. Seymour Hersh has
reported that Russian intelligence officials provided their American
counterparts with details of an April 1993 seizure by Russian agents
of 60 kilograms of weapons grade uranium at Izhevsk.1 In addition,
in September of 1995, the CIA determined that enough highly
enriched uranium to make a nuclear weapon had been stolen from a
military base near Moscow. 95 In the process of investigating, the CIA
and Russian authorities found that gyroscopes were missing from a
recently dismantled ICBM. The gyroscopes were tracked down and
seized from a shed at Amman Airport in Jordan, on their way to Iraq.
However, the uranium was unrecovered, and another batch of
gyroscopes was ultimately delivered to In al-Haytham, a missile lab
outside Baghdad.1" The German Federal Intelligence Service
reported 169 incidents of nuclear smuggling in 1995, concluding that
Iran (amongst other states) was "almost certainly interested in fissile
material on the black market."1 '
Security in Russia itself is no better. In one incident, inspectors
from the Russian Ministry of Defense found a battery of nuclearequipped SS-25 mobile missiles completely abandoned-the guards
190.
at 24.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

See Malcolm Gray & William Lowther, The Loose Nukes, MACLEAN'S, Apr. 22, 1996,
See Galeotti, supranote 185, at 436.
See icL
See ALLISON ET AL, supra note 64, at 80.
See Hersh, supranote 165, at 75.
See Gray & Lowther, supra note 190, at 24.
See id.

197. Iran Trying to Buy Nuclear Material on Black Market-German Press Report, BBC
Summary of World Broadcasts, July 22, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, BBCSWB
file.
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and technicians had left their posts to search for food.1 9 Still, the
situation seems better than the opposite extreme, in which a Russian
colonel told of the "smart aleck" in his missile regiment who figured
out how to launch an ICBM without the proper launch codes.199
More recently and most troubling, General Lebed has claimed that in
a 1996 inventory of Russia's Special Atomic Demolition Munitions
(low-yield, man-portable nuclear bombs weighing about sixty pounds
each and stored in suitcase-type containers) eighty-four were missing
and unaccounted for.2w
Additional anecdotal evidence supports the assertion that Russia
does not have control over its nuclear infrastructure. In March of
1994, the Russian Federal Security Service reported to Boris Yeltsin
that in the second half of 1993 it had logged nine hundred thefts from
military and nuclear plants and seven hundred thefts of secret
technology, most of which was conducted by insiders.2' In October,
through Operation Sapphire, the United States evacuated six
hundred kilograms of highly enriched uranium from the Ust
Kamenogorsk plant in Kazakhstan. The purchase was engineered to
prevent the uranium from finding its way into unfriendly hands, as it
was secured only by a padlock. When the shipment arrived in the
United States, it was found to contain four percent more material
than had been paid for by the United States.' In November of the
same year, Czech police seized three kilograms of HEU (87.5%
uranium-235, which is more highly enriched than the Hiroshima
bomb) from black market smugglers.' In March of 1995, Ukrainian
authorities seized six kilograms of U-235 from the Kiev apartment of
two former Russian soldiers.'
In February of 1996, Lithuanian
authorities seized two hundred and twenty pounds of uranium from
an armed gang.'
A 1991 incident highlights Russia's security dilemma, especially
the lack of loyalty in the officer corps. William Arkin, a nuclear
weapons expert for Greenpeace, negotiated to purchase a nuclear

198. See ALUSON ETAL, supra note 64, at 8.
199. See COCKBURN, supra note 41, at 246.
200. See id. at 251.

201. See Cameron, supranote 31, at 423.
202. See id. The transfer was done in a rather rapid fashion as Iran was aware of the
stockpile and also was attempting to purchase it.

203. See Hughes, supra note 86, at 63.
204. See id.
205. See David Hoffman, Russia'sNuclearSieve, WASH. POST, Apr. 17, 1996, at A25.
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warhead from a Russian officer assigned to guard a bunker in AltenGrabow, located in the former East Germany." The deal was set, a
plan hatched to smuggle the bomb out of the poorly guarded bunker,
and a price agreed upon. Arkin planned to put the warhead on
display as a protest against nuclear weapons and lax security.
However, the August 1991 coup attempt in Moscow triggered the
removal of all ex-Soviet weapons out of Germany, so the deal was
never completed.
Despite the seriousness of the problem, Moscow has been very
uncooperative in efforts to control the loose nukes. Russia's
Minatom (Ministry of Atomic Energy), and its head, Victor
Mikhailov, have been notorious both in lack of cooperation and in
denying the very existence of a problem.m Russia's nuclear arsenal is
a great source of pride and an important symbol of its remaining
power. Admitting that Moscow has less than full control over the
nuclear apparatus is an embarrassing reminder of Russia's fall from
grace.
The former Soviet Union has problems not just with fissile
materials, but with sensitive weapons-related items as well. In 1993,
Lithuanian police were tipped off that something valuable and illegal
was being stored in a bank in Vilnius. The police raided the bank and
found four tons of beryllium.'
Beryllium trade is controlled by
international agreement because, amongst other things, it is used as a
neutron reflector to boost the yield of nuclear warheads."' The
beryllium found in Vilnius was traced back to the Institute of Physics
and Power Engineering, located outside of Moscow. Apparently,
members of the Russian mafia acquired the beryllium with a bogus
requisition order. The beryllium was destined for Zurich, where a
buyer (suspected to represent the North Korean government) was
offering $24 million for the lot." Again, cooperation from Minatom
has been poor, and Victor Mikhailov went so far as to deny that
beryllium is a dual-use item or has anything to do with nuclear
weapons." Cooperation on the Russian side will have to improve
drastically if this problem is to be alleviated. The Russian
206. See Hersh, supranote 165, at 72.
207. See id.
208. See ALLISON ETAL, supranote 64, at 119.

209. See 60 Minutes: The Worst Nightmare (CBS television broadcast, Sept. 20,1995).
210. See Cotd, supranote 90, at 212.

211. See 60 Minutes, supranote 209.
212. See id.
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government has recently discovered that eighty percent of its own
nuclear facilities lack portal monitors--exit doors with built-in
radiation detectors to prevent insider theft.213 Simply put, Russia is a
sieve, and it is possible that enough fissile material, and perhaps even
operable weapons, have escaped the country to keep numerous
terrorists occupied. In any event, the Russian situation creates a
great deal of uncertainty about how much fissile material is in the
wrong hands.
D. The Brain Drain: Weapons Designers for Hire
A companion issue to the loose nukes dilemma is commonly
known as the brain drain-scientists and engineers in the fields of
weapons design, missile technology, and nuclear physics formerly
laboring for the Soviets are now out of work and looking for
employment. Many are finding high-paying jobs in China, Pakistan,
Iran, Iraq, Libya, and other states seeking to advance their own
nuclear programs. Employing experienced weapons designers can
shave a substantial amount off the total time needed to develop a
functional nuclear weapon.
The brain drain problem is growing. A help-wanted ad for a
Hong Kong weapons company recently appeared in the Middle East:
"We have detailed files on hundreds of former Soviet Union experts
in the field of rocket, missile, and nuclear weapons. These experts
are willing to work
in a country which needs their skills and can offer
2 14
reasonable pay.
North Korea recently tried to recruit a group of 64 Russian
missile experts with offers of $3,000 a month.21
Given that the
scientists and engineers were earning about $20 per month in Russia,
the offer was quite attractive. Fortunately, all 64 were arrested while
attempting to board a plane bound for Pyongyang.216
Indeed, while the base wage in Russia for such scientists is
around U.S. $67 per month, Iran is offering upwards of $5,000.217
Scientists at Arzamas-16, a Russian nuclear weapons lab, staged a
protest in 1993 over their lack of housing, health care, and regular

213. See Jessica Stem, Act Now To Prevent Nuclear Terror in the Future, INT'L HERALD
TRIB., Apr. 11, 1996, availablein LEXIS, News Library, Non-US File.
214. CNN FutureWatch (CNN cable television broadcast, Mar. 17,1996).
215. See Hersh, supra note 165, at 76.
216. See id.
217. See Cameron, supra note 31, at 423.
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paychecks. 28
In October of 1996, the director of Russia's
Chelyabinsk-70 nuclear complex committed suicide because he was
ashamed that his scientists were not even paid the $50 monthly wage
they were promised by the government. '9
While the United States has provided funding through the NunnLugar Act' to establish gainful employment for these experts, this
sort of atomic public-works project cannot compete with the salaries
being offered by Iran, Libya, and other proliferators. The Russian
Federal Counter-Intelligence Service (formerly the KGB) claims that
it has successfully monitored a "golden fund" of two to three
thousand key nuclear weapons scientists. However, thousands more
are equally knowledgeable and capable in their fields.21 A recent
CIA report concludes that Russian efforts to control the brain drain
have collapsed. m
E. Shopping Wholesale-The Civilian Market
Access to the Russian market is one possibility, but terrorists
and proliferators may have a better route. Some 260 commercial
nuclear power plants are currently operating in the non-Western
world, and each has the capacity to produce bomb-grade plutonium.'
Security at facilities in the United States and Europe is poor; in
developing countries, it is even worse.
The total amount of fissile material in circulation today is
staggering. Some one thousand metric tons of plutonium are
presently in existence, spread amongst military and civilian programs
in 22 countries.m Another fifteen hundred tons of HEU is present in
m Given that many of those weapons
deployed or surplus weapons.2
(about 90%) are held by the United States and Russia, and a large
quantity are scheduled to be dismantled, the quantity of fissile
material in circulation will increase dramatically in the coming

218. See Hersh, supranote 165, at 76.
219. See Rosenthal, supranote 3, at A19.
220. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-106, §
1201, 110 Stat. 186, 469 (1996).
221. See Galeotti, supra note 185, at 434.
222. See id.
223. See Louis Rene Beres, On InternationalLaw and Nuclear Terrorism,24 GA. J. INT'L &

COMP. L. 1, 13 (1994).
224. See Kelman & Gualtieri, supranote 79, at 684 n.55. Of that quantity, about 650 tons
are in civilian hands.
225. See U
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years.2 Further, by 2003, another 330 metric tons of reactor-grade
plutonium, separated from spent fuel, will be available for use.'
The Clinton administration could complicate the situation. Over
objections from his own arms control team, the President is set to
follow Department of Energy recommendations that will allow
plutonium from dismantled nuclear warheads to be used in civilian
power plants.2 The plan reverses a twenty-year-old policy designed
to keep weapons-grade plutonium out of the civilian sector, a policy
specifically intended to prevent plutonium from falling into the hands
of terrorists and rogue states. 9 Ironically, as recently as 1993 the
Clinton Administration stated, "the United States does not
encourage the civil use of plutonium. '
While the proposed MOX (mixed oxide) plan is designed to mix
weapons-grade material with highly radioactive waste to render it
unusable by bomb builders,"1 fissile materials transferred to civilian
plants need military-quality security. The policy is also expected to
encourage the Russians to use plutonium from dismantled warheads
in their own power plants, and it may revive Europe's faltering
plutonium power industry. 22 Since such programs involve the
transportation of fissile material and its use in non-military facilities,
experts fear terrorists will have an easier time stealing plutonium.
F. A Messy Alternative: Radiological Weapons
Rather than detonate a nuclear device, terrorists could deploy a
radiological weapon, which is cheaper and much less difficult from a
technical perspective. A radiological weapon consists of radioactive
material (cesium, strontium, etc.) which is either introduced into a
water supply, delivered by an explosive device, or possibly dispersed
through an air-handling system. Thus, a radiological threat (or a
hoax) would be more credible than a nuclear bomb threat because it
involves a smaller amount of nuclear material and is technologically
less sophisticated.
For a radiological device, weapons-grade

226. See id.
227. See id2
228. See Peter Passell, U.S. Set to Allow Reactors to Use Plutonium From DisarmedBombs,

N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 22,1996, at Al.
229. See id. at A22.
230. Id.
231. The fissile material is recoverable, but the process is difficult and quite dangerous
given the blending with highly radioactive waste. See id232. See Passell, supra note 228, at A22.

110

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 8:79

materials are not needed, and indeed are undesirable due to their low
levels of radioactivity. 3
Depending on the concentration of radioactive material, a
radiological attack could cause cancers, induce acute radiation
poisoning, or result in widescale fatalities. A dozen kilograms of
plutonium-oxide powder dispersed with explosives could conceivably
kill fifty thousand."' A Pravdaarticle claims that a small cylinder of
strontium tied to a hand grenade would kill everything in a onekilometer radius. 5 Terrorists are well aware of the utility of
radiological materials-a kilo of cesium will fetch $100,000 on the
Russian black market.'
Radiological terrorists could go after office buildings (3.5 ounces
of plutonium particles would be enough to kill everyone in a large
building or factory 7 ), densely populated urban areas, or
concentrations of people at sporting events or similar venues.
Alternatively, the contamination of food and water supplies could
serve as an effective means for spreading radiation."
Radiological warfare has already been toyed with. In November
of 1995, Chechen guerrilla leader Shamyl Basayev informed Russia's
NTV television that four cases of cesium had been hidden around
Moscow. NTV found a case in Ismailovo Park containing thirty-two
kilograms of cesium-137." 9 Russian authorities noted that the cesium
was industrial in nature, used in X-ray equipment."
But such
material could be mated to a conventional explosive to create
poisonous fallout. In another incident, a Moscow businessman was
recently killed when Russian Mafia operatives placed gamma-ray
emitting pellets in his office."4
The United States also faces the threat of a radiological
dispersion device (RDD). Following the 1993 World Trade Center
bombing, FBI agents investigated a group of Iranians who were
suspected of plotting to disperse radioactive material around
233. See ALLISONET AL, supranote 64, at 12.

234. See David Hughes, When Terrorists Go Nuclear, POPULAR MECHANICS, Jan. 1996, at
59.
235. See Alexei Bausin, Radioactive Death Merchants, RUSSIAN PRESS DIG., Apr. 26, 1996,
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Manhattan.24 While the threat never materialized, the FBI took it
seriously, given the amount of radiological material available on the
Russian black market.
IV. THE THREAT: FEAR OF THE UNKNOWN
Monday, 0900. The President arrives at his desk in the Oval
Office and settles in to read his daily intelligence briefing when his
national security advisor bursts through the door, holding in his hand
a fax just received on his private line from an unnamed group.
"Greetings. We demand that the United States remove all of its
military forces, assets, and prepositioned materi6l from the Middle
East, including Kuwait, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Iraq, Turkey,
and the waters of the Persian Gulf. In addition, all military and
financial aid to Israel must cease. We realize that this will take time,
so enclosed please find a timetable for these events. We believe the
schedule is reasonable.
"Failure to comply will result in the detonation of an atomic
bomb in Washington, D.C. To show we are not bluffing, enclosed
please find a schematic of our weapon. Failure to meet our demands
will result in Armageddon."
The design turns out to be workable. United States intelligence
is cognizant of the fact that enough material has leaked out of Russia
to build several bombs, and Iran is thought to be close to its own
capability. Pakistan, now under a less friendly regime, could also
have been a supplier. The timetable is indeed "reasonable," but the
first deadline, to remove all naval assets from the Gulf, is in a week's
time.
The President and his team face numerous problems. If the
threat is taken seriously, the White House must decide if it should go
public. Going public would give the population a chance to evacuate
the city, but could cause mass panic. At the same time, it might anger
the terrorists and suggest unwillingness to meet their demands. A
mad-dash evacuation might also encourage other terrorists to yank
the American chain with threats of nuclear terror. Alternatively, the
terrorists could lay low, wait for the citizens to return to their homes
(maybe a few weeks after the evacuation), and then detonate the
weapon.24
242. See FBI probed Iraniannuclear attack plan, UPI, Feb. 19, 1996, available in LEXIS,

News Library, UPI File.
243. Not unlike the 1980s strategy of reseeding targets, whereby a nuclear power would
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On the other hand, the threat could be kept secret. With one
week to either comply or locate and disable the bomb, the White
House does have some room to maneuver. Since the terrorists were
kind enough to reveal the target city, the Nuclear Emergency Search
Team (NEST)'"can be called in to search Washington. If the bomb
is found in time, things can be kept quiet. If not, any surviving
government officials will be in trouble for knowing and not warning
the population. Even if the bomb is found, there is no guarantee that
the terrorists do not have another (or cannot get another) and would
not try again.
A. A Note on Threat Credibility and Terrorist Demands 5
The Washington scenario highlights yet another serious problem
facing policy makers: How can they determine if the threat is really
credible? It is widely known that fissile materials and perhaps even
operable warheads are in the wrong hands. Information on building
atom bombs can be pulled off the internet,m and plenty of groups are
motivated to attack the United States. Given these factors, terrorists
might not even need a nuclear bomb to make a credible threat.
Unless a terrorist makes a frivolous-and thus suspect-demand (for
example, asking for only a few hundred thousand dollars), any threat
should be taken seriously. How can decisionmakers determine if a
threat is really credible?
Terrorists desirous of being taken seriously might provide a
bomb schematic or other evidence of technical sophistication (as in
the aforementioned scenario). They could furnish a small sample of
the fissile material to a government agency or the press. If a stolen
weapon is involved, they might supply the serial number or other
identification. However, while each of these steps would give the
threat more credibility, supplying such evidence would also provide
clues that might be used to track down the terrorists. In that case,
anyone involved in atomic terror would have to the weigh the
benefits of being taken seriously against the risk of revealing too

launch a strike, wait a few weeks for the survivors to come out of their fallout shelters, and

strike again, thereby making sure to kill everyone.
244. See discussion of NEST, infra p. 122.

245. The entire credibility discussion assumes terrorists are using nuclear bombs to make
demands.

A surprise attack as discussed in the New York scenario and suggested by the

discussion of terrorism trends negates the credibility issue.
246. See, e.g., First InternationalVirtual Conference on Mad Science (last modified March

25,1996) <http'//www.ftech.net/%7Emadsite/index.shtml>.
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much.
Thus, credibility would be a central issue in addressing the
nuclear menace. Failure to take a legitimate threat seriously could be
catastrophic. The credibility issue harkens back to the debate within
the U.S. government about conducting a demonstration explosion
before dropping the bomb on Hiroshima. 247 Well-equipped terrorists
might indeed use one of their bombs as a demonstration shot in some
uninhabited or sparsely populated area. Panicking the general
population also limits the government's room to maneuver, and
demands may have to be met in order to avoid widespread chaos
amongst the citizenry.
However, even if credibility is established, concessions by the
threatened government are not automatic, as the scope of terrorist
demands would likely be commensurate with the magnitude of the
threat. In the Washington scenario, the demand of a U.S. pull-out
from the Gulf and suspension of all aid to Israel would be a
considerable price to pay. Such a concession would set a precedent
for other blackmailers. Further, American security guarantees to its
allies would no longer be credible, radically altering the balance of
power around the world. Thus, the terrorists might find themselves
forced to maintain the threat indefinitely to prevent a policy
reversion.
B. Deterrence Failure
The credibility of a terrorist threat from the technical end is one
thing, but what about intent? Would a rogue state or subnational
actor really execute an act of nuclear terror, knowing what the price
would be? Is not an act of nuclear terror inherently suicidal? No, it
is not. Nuclear terror can be anonymous. Even if the attack is
claimed, retaliation may still be problematic. These and other factors
make the threat of nuclear terror more likely, because the traditional
deterrent of nuclear retaliation that kept the Soviets at bay may not
apply to terrorists.
A generally accepted lesson of the Cold War is that the United
States and the Soviet Union never exchanged nuclear salvos (at least
once both sides had substantial arsenals) because of MAD doctrine.
MAD (Mutually Assured Destruction) dictated that even if one
country fired its weapons in a surprise attack, the opposing country
247. Some U.S. officials believed that Japan would surrender after witnessing a mere test-

site detonation of an atomic bomb.
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would either be able to retaliate in time, or have enough of its arsenal
survive the first strike to ensure that the attacker was wiped out.
Thus, nuclear war was a no-win situation.
While experts may argue about the value of MAD and its role in
history, what seems clear is that, for deterrence to work, one must
know who the attacker is. As Joseph Nye has observed,
"The logic of
''
deterrence fails when there is no return address."
Deterrence is problematic because the threat of retaliation must
be absolutely credible. If a terrorist group detonates a nuclear
weapon in New York and the authorities trace the bomb to the
group, what sort of retaliation is credible (or justifiable)? Say the
group is based in the Bekaa Valley. Should the United States nuke
Lebanon? Perhaps the bomb was stolen from Iran. Should the
United States nuke Iran? Maybe the Iranians provided the bomb,
but claim it was stolen. Then what? Perhaps the Iranians supplied a
bomb to be used against Iraq, but the subnational actor executing the
attack decided to shift targets. Should a country which allows the
theft of nuclear materials or weapons, either through inadequate
security, corruption, or negligence be denied its nuclear arsenal and
related capabilities? For example, if Iran cannot safeguard its
nuclear weapons, should the United States take down its entire
nuclear infrastructure? What about Russia, which easily falls into the
same category?
One more element in the deterrence problem is that of the
rational actor. 29 The MAD doctrine assumes that no one wants his
own group, population, or country to be eradicated. But suppose that
the perpetrator of nuclear terror is an Islamic fundamentalist regime
in Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, or that a subnational group of similar bent is
involved. Indeed, some members of such groups might even stay
with the bomb until it goes off.
If a group has no fear of death, deterrence will not work. If a
group believes that the coming dawn of a new century means "the
end is near" and it must be helped along (as was true for Aum
Shinrikyo), deterrence will not work. Dealing with actors who do not
behave in a "rational" way increases the uncertainty factor inherent
in nuclear terrorism.

248. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Diplomatic Measures, in NEW NUCLEAR NATIONS 83 (Robert D.
Blackwill & Albert Carnesale eds., 1993).
249. See generally Michele A. Flournoy, Implications for U.S. Military Strategy, in NEW
NUCLEAR NATIONS, 142 (Robert D. Blackwill & Albert Camesale eds., 1993).
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Rationality also influences perception, and perceptions about
the credibility of a U.S. deterrent may not be as strong as one might
think. For example, one could argue that Saddam Hussein did not
believe the United States would come to the defense of Kuwait
because of his understanding of Vietnam and the American public's
aversion to heavy casualties.' ° More recent incidents in Somalia,
Bosnia, Rwanda and Haiti could create some confusion as to
American resolve and embolden terrorists."1

V. COUNTERMEASURES
The perils of nuclear terror seem insurmountable, and one
reason they are often ignored, at least in public, is that the threat is so
substantial while potential solutions are difficult. However, the
United States does have some options which can at least reduce the
threat. Clearly, combating terrorism is a sensible route to pursue.
The usual options of intelligence gathering, infiltrating terrorist
groups, attacking training camps, pressuring state sponsors and
cooperating with other countries are all generally valuable means of
reducing the threat of nuclear attack. But the focus of this segment
will be on efforts specific to the nuclear threat, which poses
additional challenges to the United States above and beyond
conventional terrorism.
A. Intelligence
Intelligence is of critical importance in combating nuclear terror.
The United States needs as much information as it can get. How
much fissile material do proliferators have? How much can they get
their hands on? Will they pass materials to sub-national actors?
What about Russian supplies and weapons? Which terrorist groups
have been trying to acquire nuclear weapons? Do stolen Russian
warheads have adequate security lockouts, or can terrorists operate
them at will? Are Russian officers amenable to selling warheads?
Which officers, at which facilities? How much money would it take
to buy a warhead? The access codes? Some surplus plutonium?
These and other questions must be answered, so that when
250. Again, world leaders look to U.S. actions as indicators of future resolve.
251. Consider another perception problem as it relates to nuclear terror. What if some
terrorists or rogue states believe that Gulf War Syndrome was the result of Iraqi chemical or
biological attacks, the U.S. government knew of those attacks, and failed to retaliate? While
this reading of events may be inaccurate, it is not unrealistic, and terrorists could interpret the

incident as a lack of resolve on the part of the United States.
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Washington gets a nuclear threat, its credibility can be accurately
assessed.
The CIA and FBI are hard at work on the issue,' but also
involved is the Department of Energy's Z Division, based at the
Lawrence Livermore Laboratory in California. ' Z Division analysts
handle the most sensitive nuclear proliferation intelligence available.
Z Division has studied the link between the Russian Mafia and the
nuclear black market, as well as the possibility that some Russiancontrolled nuclear weapons held in Ukraine were appropriated by
officers loyal to Kiev?24
Most importantly, there is the issue of deterrence. In the event
of a nuclear detonation, tracing the bomb to its origin will require
some good intelligence work. If the bomb cannot be traced, the
United States cannot retaliate. If terrorists think (rightly or wrongly)
that American intelligence capabilities are lacking, they will be more
likely to strike, being less fearful of retaliation. Inadequate
intelligence will severely handicap the United States in its efforts to
deal with nuclear terror in a crisis situation.
B. Covert Operations
The U.S. Congressional Research Service (CRS) has its own
suggestions on how to deal with nuclear proliferation and the threat
that a weapon might fall into terrorist hands. In its report, Nuclear,
Biological, Chemical Weapons Proliferation: Potential Military
Countermeasures, CRS suggests bribing, rehiring, or kidnapping
scientists and engineers involved in nuclear weapons programs.'s
Further, military forces could "abscond" with nuclear weapons or
weapons parts, or switch critical parts with defective ones. Exotic
devices including sticky glue guns, aqueous aerosols, anti-traction
lubricants, liquid metal embrittlement agents, and non-nuclear
electromagnetic pulse weapons could be employed to disrupt or
destroy a weapons programl 6 Needless to say, action of such sort
could start a war, and the technologies suggested are far from
perfected.
252. The FBI now has a liaison office in Moscow to keep tabs on the nuclear black market.
See Galeotti, supra note 185, at 434.
253. See Hersh, supranote 165, at 74.

254. See id. at 75.
255. See Barbara Starr, Covert ProliferationSolutions Studied, JANE'S DEF. WKLY., July 9,
1994, at 4.
256. See id.
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Covert operations can indeed lead to war, especially if directed
at a proliferator state's nuclear program. And doing so when a
proliferator has managed to assemble a few weapons is very
dangerous. Still, a conventional war far afield might be preferable to
falling victim to nuclear terrorists. This line of reasoning was a factor
in the decision to go to war against Iraq in 1991.
C. Counterproliferation
Several legal regimes are in place to stem the spread of nuclear
weapons to other countries. At the forefront is the NPT.27 In effect
since 1968, the NPT is designed to limit nuclear weapons status to the
five original nuclear powers. The treaty governs the use of nuclear
power for peaceful purposes and allows signatories to operate
research reactors or power plants, with the requirement that declared
facilities will be inspected by the IAEA to ensure material is not
being diverted to weapons programs.2
The NPT has not proven very effective at restricting the spread
of nuclear weapons. Several states, including Israel, Pakistan, South
Africa, and India have proliferated outside the treaty regime, as none
is an NPT signatory. 9 NPT regime members Iraq and North
Koreae 1 have come very close to nuclear weapons status despite
IAEA safeguards (and indeed North Korea probably has a few
bombs stashed away). Other countries such as Iran are also NPT
signatories, but pursue the development of nuclear weapons just the
same.262
The NPT is riddled with problems. A two-tiered structure
formalizes the status of the five original nuclear powers (United
States, Russia, China, United Kingdom, France) while barring other
countries from building nuclear weapons, thus robbing the treaty of
257. The international community has erected an extensive architecture of treaties and

implementation groups to stem proliferation, including the Physical Protection of Nuclear
Materials Convention, Treaty of Tlateloco, Limited Test Ban Treaty, London Nuclear
Suppliers Group, Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls, and the IAEA.
See Paul Doty & Steven Flank, Arms Control for New Nuclear Nations, in NEW NUCLEAR
NATIONS 53, 56 (Robert D. Blackwill & Albert Carnesale eds., 1993).

258. See Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483,
729 U.N.T.S. 161.
259. South Africa is now within the NPT framework, having given up its weapons. See id.
at 62-63.
260. See generallySheinman, supranote 154.
261. See David E. Sanger, North Korea, on Long Leash, Runs CirclesAround Its Foes, N.Y.

TIMEs, Mar. 20,1994, § 4, at 1.
262. See COCKBURN, supra note 41, at 162,174.
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some of its legitimacy.m Furthermore, several key countries are not
signatories.' " Also, the NPT lacks significant enforcement powers as
the IAEA is limited in its ability to inspect facilities.2 " Even Iraq,
which is under considerable scrutiny in the wake of the Gulf War, has
obstructed the IAIBA on countless occasions.2" So while the NPT has
been indefinitely extended after a hectic 1995 Review Conference,
few of its inadequacies have been addressed.
There is of course the option of more active
counterproliferation, specifically direct military action.26 But as
noted in the covert operations discussion above, bombing nuclear
facilities is likely to start a war. Such an occurrence might not be a
real problem in Iran, for example, as the Iranians lack the means to
effectively retaliate (at least to a Desert Storm-type air war).
Military action against North Korea would be more problematic,
however, as Pyongyang could send its troops south. There is also the
issue of following up with ground forces, not to take territory, but to
ensure that all the relevant facilities were adequately disabled and
that no more remain hidden. The more advanced a country's nuclear
program, the more targets would have to be destroyed-reactors,
research labs, storage depots, and enrichment facilities.2
Military strikes are difficult, but might prove necessary,
particularly if intelligence sources indicate a state-sponsored attack
or weapons-handover is imminent. Furthermore, if the country in
question is advanced to the degree that U.S. intelligence is unsure
whether the target has an operable weapon, an attack is complicated
by the risk that it could invite nuclear terrorism-the very event
Washington seeks to avoid.6 9

263. The NPT does obligate the nuclear club to make efforts toward total disarmament, and
other countries often complain that they have not kept their end of the bargain. Even with the
INF and START treaties, warhead totals remain high.

264. For example, as non-signatories Pakistan, India, Israel, Brazil, and Argentina have all
developed or considered developing nuclear capabilities. See Doty & Flank, supranote 257, at

64-69.
265. See i. at 55.
266. See id at 54.
267. Bombing nuclear facilities creates a whole new host of issues: finding the targets,
hitting them with precision-guided munitions, penetrating underground bunkers, preventing the
dispersal of radioactive materials, etc.
268. See Philip Zelikow, Offensive Military Options, in NEW NUCLEAR NATIONS 162, 167
(Robert D. Blackwill & Albert Camesale eds., 1993).

269. See id.at 171.
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D. Safeguarding Nuclear Facilities
In its Report Of The InternationalTask Force On Prevention Of
Nuclear Terrorism, the Nuclear Control Institute suggested several
steps to ensure that terrorists would not be able to sabotage nuclear
facilities or appropriate fissile materials.' 0 The recommendations
include authorizing guards to use deadly force, improving physical
barriers and upgrading security, and developing reactor control
technology to deter sabotage. 1 The recommendations are simple,
but the nuclear power industry in the United States has balked at
such advice due to the cost and inconvenience of upgrading security
protocols. Facilities in other countries may be even less secure.
All nuclear facilities, whether they are U.S. power plants,
Russian weapons laboratories, or the arsenals of proliferators, must
be safeguarded against theft. Further, personnel involved with fissile
materials and nuclear weapons must be reliable. This is not presently
the case in Russia, and one can imagine that personnel in other
countries could succumb to bribery or blackmail. If the Clinton plan
to transfer weapons grade plutonium to civilian facilities goes
through, the risk will be even greater.
Consolidation of facilities is an effective means of reducing the
risk of insider theft or sale. The Department of Energy has
announced plans to reduce the number of fissile material production
and storage facilities in the United States to three.f3 Russia needs to
do the same. Russian stockpiles and production facilities are spread
out over an enormous area. There are so many different sites that
the system has been referred to as the "Russian Nuclear
Archipelago. ' 4 A smaller number of centralized sites is easier to
safeguard and depends upon a smaller number of guards, decreasing
the risk of insider theft or sale.
E. Controlling Loose Nukes and Brain Drains
The United States has attempted to deal with the loose nukes
and brain drain problems, most notably through the Nunn-Lugar
legislationm 5 Nunn-Lugar provides some $1.5 billion to assist former
270. See Beres, supranote 223, at 16-17.

271. See id. at 16.
272. See discussion suprap. 124.
273. See Departmentof Energy Briefing on Plutonium Production and Storage (C-SPAN,
Dec. 10, 1996).

274. Cot6, supranote 90, at 177.
275.See Former Soviet Union Demilitarization Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-484, 106 Stat. 2315

120

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 8:79

Soviet republics safely dismantle, transport, and protect nuclear
warheads and materials. 6 Aside from the fact that the money is not
enough to safeguard the old Soviet arsenal, it only applies to Russia,
Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan.'
Other former republics,
including Lithuania and Azerbaijan, maintain nuclear materials and
technologies which remain unsafeguarded' 8 As for the brain drain,
Nunn-Lugar money has gone to the International Science and
Technology Center, a Moscow institute designed to put former
nuclear scientists and weapons designers to work on non-military
projects." However, as noted previously, such make-work programs
cannot compete with the paychecks being offered by proliferators.
Senators Nunn and Lugar have recently proposed follow-up
legislation designed to halt the smuggling of nuclear weapons and
materials from the former Soviet Union. The plan, with a suggested
starting price of $300 million, would attempt to prevent smuggling at
four points: inside the former U.S.S.R., at the borders of the newly
independent states, at the U.S. border, and at the probable target
cities.m Under Nunn-Lugar, cooperative threat reduction continued
with another $300 million authorized in fiscal year 1996. 28' Five
million dollars in funding has also been provided for training and
equipping police and fire officials in the United States to deal with a
nuclear, chemical, or radiological attack.'
Another solution to the loose nukes problem is the U.S. plan to
purchase Russian fissile material. The United States has agreed to
buy five hundred metric tons of Russian HEU over the next twenty
years, at a purchase price of $12 billion m Every bit of weaponsgrade material taken from Russia and placed in U.S. custody is
material not available to terrorists. Indeed, the program should be
accelerated, as twenty years is quite a long time. However, such

(1992).
276.
277.
278.
279.

See Stem, supranote 213.
See id.
See Galeotti, supra note 185.
See ALLISON ET AL, supranote 64, at 90.

280. See Lawmakers Call For Layered Defense Against Nuclear Terrorism, Deutsche
Presse-Agentur, June 25,1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Cumws File.
281. See National Defense Authorization Act For Fiscal Year 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-106, §
1201, 110 Stat. 186, 469 (1996).
282. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, §
819, 110 Stat. 1214,1316 (1996).
283. See Richard A. Falkenrath, The HEU Deal, in GRAHAM T. ALLISON ET AL.,
AVOIDING NUCLEAR ANARCHY 229, app. C (1996).
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programs cannot completely resolve the problem, as fissile materials
are available elsewhere, and enough has already been smuggled out
of Russia to cause concern.
F. Technology Options for Bomb Security
One way to prevent existing nuclear weapons from being
misused lies in technological applications. Many nuclear weapons are
equipped with permissive action links (PAL)-systems which prevent
the weapon from being detonated without the proper access code.'
Some PAL systems are more sophisticated, disabling the bomb if it is
tampered with or if the wrong code is entered.' American weapons
are often outfitted with environmental sensing devices (ESD), which
prevent detonation unless the weapon has undergone the physical
For example, a missile
parameters associated with delivery."
warhead would not detonate unless it had experienced the
acceleration and velocity of a launch.'
Unfortunately, not all nuclear weapons are equipped with PALs
and ESDs. The Russians have been educated regarding technological
protections through Nunn-Lugar funding, but the United States
should further insist that all Russian weapons have at least the PALs
feature. And what about other countries? Some have suggested
supplying these technologies to proliferators, especially those prone
to instability and lacking procedures for the peaceful transfer of
power.'
Weapons designers could take the protective process a step
further. Outfitting nuclear weapons with auto-destruct systems could
be used to safeguard nuclear arsenals, especially the Russian
stockpile. Many types of landmines are designed with such a remote
disabling system, as are satellite launch vehicles and missiles used on
test ranges. Each warhead could be equipped with a system that
enables a command authority to broadcast a signal to disable the
weapon, so that if a bomb were illicitly sold or stolen it could be
rendered inoperable. Such a system would necessitate the use of
satellites to ensure that the bomb could be deactivated wherever it
284. See Steven E. Miller, Assistance to Newly ProliferatingNations, in NEW NUCLEAR
NATIONS 97, 117 (Robert D. Blackwill & Albert Carnesale eds., 1993).

285.
286.
287.
288.
289.

See id.
See id. at 116.
See id
See National Defense Authorization Act, supranote 281.
See id. at 117.
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was taken. Terrorists familiar with the system might try to jam the
disabling signal, necessitating countermeasures in the design of any
auto-destruct mechanism.
Additionally, nuclear weapons could be equipped with Global
Positioning System (GPS) beacons so that stolen items could be
traced and recovered. The GPS system could be further mated to the
auto-disable mechanism, so that an effort to deactivate the tracking
system would disable the weapon, as would moving the weapon
beyond a set radius from its designated storage facility. Again, the
issue of jamming would be problematic, but if thieves or purchasers
were not aware of the tracking feature, they might be taken by
surprise.
Of course, even the inclusion of auto-destruct and tracking
systems in every single nuclear weapon currently in existence will not
entirely eliminate the threat, as a proliferator or sub-national actor
could simply build a device without such features. Alternatively, the
fissile material might be extracted and used in a home-made weapon.
Still, eliminating the possibility that a stolen nuclear weapon could
ever be used against its creator is a good idea.
G. NEST
If rogue states and terrorist groups outsmart intelligence assets,
then they must deal with the Nuclear Emergency Search Team
(NEST). Since its inception in 1974, NEST has fielded some eighty
threats of nuclear terrorism.2' Fortunately, each threat has been a
false alarm, but the team prepares for the day when the threat is real.
NEST members periodically measure background radiation in major
cities so that, in the event of a threat, the team can overfly the area
and detect any fluctuations. 1
Bob Kelly, current head of NEST at Los Alamos, discusses the
problem facing his organization:
If I find a bomb, I want to be able to guess whether it will work or
not. I'd like to be able to make radiation measurements and then
make some sense out of the measurements. If it goes off-and God
help us if it goes off-I want to make additional measurements of
debris and find out what we have. One of the scariest things is if
someone confronts you with one device, and now comes back and

290. See STEPHEN BOWMAN, WHEN THE EAGLE SCREAMS 193 (1994).

291. See id. Unfortunately, a terrorist device is likely to be shielded, making detection by
this method virtually impossible.
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says he has five more. Do you want to believe him?2 2
Detection of a nuclear weapon is a difficult task. Former NEST
leader Mahlon E. Gates observes, "If an improvised nuclear device
were hidden in a large metropolitan city such as New York or
Chicago, with no further information on its location, it would be next
to impossible for NEST to find it within a limited period of time."2'
But NEST faces additional problems. While funding is running
at $70 million per year (less than Hizballah's estimated annual
budget), most of the members of the group are volunteers from
nuclear weapons programs at Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore, and
other labs.' As America's nuclear weapons program has been cut in
half following the end of the Cold War, many of the skilled scientists
and engineers at these labs have moved to the private sector and are
no longer available to NEST. 5 Furthermore, the field is so
specialized that NEST is unable to rely on outside personnel or
technologies, as they do not exist.
Still, NEST is a well-trained and equipped organization. Its
agents operate a large fleet of specially-outfitted vans, helicopters,
and aircraft to aid in the search for wayward atomic devices. NEST
also has access to a large array of clothing and disguises. Indeed,
team members often dress as tourists or businessmen, and conceal
their radiation detectors in briefcases, backpacks, or laptop
computers so as not to arouse suspicion. 6
Once a nuclear bomb is discovered, NEST has several options
for disabling it. Many NEST members are themselves nuclear
weapons designers capable of deactivating a bomb, and the team
works closely with specially-trained ordnance disposal experts from
the Defense Department.2 7
Demolition experts could use
conventional explosives to destroy the bomb without setting off the
physics package.'
Alternatively, agents can pour liquid nitrogen
over the device to freeze its electronics and delay detonation until the
bomb can be disarmed. 9 This assumes that the bomb can be
292. Gary Taubes, CounteringNuclear Terrorism: Dwindling Capabilities?, SCIENCE, Feb.

24, 1995, at 1096.
293. BOWMAN, supra note 290, at 193.

294.
59.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.

See David Hughes, When Terrorists Go Nuclear, POPULAR MECHANICS, Jan. 1996, at
See Taubes, supra note 292, at 1096.
See Douglas Waller, NuclearNinjas,TIME, Jan. 8,1996, at 38.
See Hughes, supra note 294, at 59.
See Waller, supranote 296, at 40.
See id.
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discovered and disarmed in time. If not, efforts turn to tracing a
detonated nuclear device back to its origin.
H. Tracing the Bomb to its Origin
The ability to trace a nuclear weapon, detonated or not, back to
its point of origin could restore the aegis of deterrence. If potential
attackers are aware that their handiwork can and will be traced, they
might think twice due to fear of retaliation.' Even in the case of a
stolen weapon, the United States could identify a country which
lacked adequate controls on the security of its weapons.
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory has begun studying
how to determine the origin of a nuclear bomb after detonation to
track unattributed terrorist attacks. 3°' Despite the power of the atom,
little matter is actually destroyed in an atomic explosion, meaning
that traces of fissile material and bomb components will remain,
though they may be difficult to reach in a radioactive environment.'
NEST members or other experts can use special equipment to locate
those fissile material fragments among the rubble. Once the
fragments, possibly no bigger than dust particles, are recovered, they
can be analyzed.
Samples can be placed in a gamma-ray
spectrometer, which identifies elements and isotopes.' The pit, or
physics package, of a nuclear warhead is mostly plutonium or
uranium, but other elements and isotopes will be present. Among
them could be tritium, U-240, neptunium, americium, gadolinium,
curium, and promethium.' The presence of these substances, and
the ratios in which they are present, can indicate the source of the
fissile material in a nuclear device. Some of the isotopes are
impurities inherent in the enrichment process, indicating which
enrichment process was involved, something else to provide clues.
Other isotopes could indicate where the pre-enrichment fissile

300. Retaliation and the MAD doctrine do assume rational actors. The retaliation doctrine
is a concept of striking back in the event of being attacked, with the underlying concept that if
an adversary expects retaliation, he might not attack in the first place. The fear is that some
sub-national actors do not care if they are killed.

301. See Hughes, supranote 86, at 64.
302. See TOM CLANCY, TIE SUM OF ALL FEARS 715 (1991). Tom Clancy has access to
high level officials in the Pentagon and the military. His descriptions and depictions are widely
regarded as accurate, and given the sensitive nature of the subject, this novel provides one of

the best available accounts of how a terrorist bomb might be traced.
303. See id. at 756.

304. See id.
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material in the bomb was mined 5 Each of these traits is a clue to
the bomb's origin.
The IAEA keeps detailed records of fissile material production
runs and the exact ratios of elements and isotopes present in any
given year's output.30 But these records are only kept for those
facilities under IAEA safeguard, which excludes the five official
nuclear powers and nonsignatories to the NPT (i.e. Israel), as well as
facilities operated in a covert manner, outside the scope of IAEA
monitoring.' The United States supposedly keeps such records of its
own fissile material output,' and it is likely that Britain and France
do as well. Russian records may not be as good, and even if they are,
the Russians may not want to share them in the aftermath of a
terrorist incident, as the revelation that the United States was
attacked with misappropriated Russian material would be
enormously embarrassing to Moscow. Still, records from the United
States and other countries can serve to narrow the gap by ruling out
certain sources, and not all clues require access to such records.
Again, scientists may be able to determine the geographical origin of
fissile material by tracing impurities to particular uranium mines.
The makeup of fissile material also indicates which enrichment
process was involved, something else to provide clues.
Given all of the above, one way to trace nuclear weapons would
be to tag fissile materials.' Just as conventional explosives can be
marked with paper taggants or unique chemical combinations,31
nuclear materials could be similarly modified by altering the ratios of
isotopes so that a bomb was easily identifiable. A multilateral treaty
with all nuclear weapons powers could mandate that each country
use a particular ratio of isotopes so that nuclear weapons and fissile
material outputs are easily identifiable.
But even if the experts are able to determine the bomb's origin,
the question remains: Then what? The weapon's origin is certainly a
valuable clue, but the perpetrators are still unidentified. Was the
bomb stolen? Purchased? By whom? The cooperation of officials
from suspected countries would be crucial to answer such questions.
305. A somewhat theoretical proposition. Investigators would require data on whether and
how uranium and other materials vary by geographic origin.
306. See Keilman & Gualtieri, supranote 79, at 706.
307. See id.
308. See CLANCY, supra note 302, at 756.
309. See Kellman & Gualtieri, supranote 79, at 679.
310. There has been movement to mandate inclusion of such markings in explosives.
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Thus, while tracing a bomb to its manufacturer will certainly be
helpful in aiding investigators and restoring deterrence, it will not in
itself solve the problem presented.
VI. THE FUTURE: PROSPECTS AND PRESCRIPTIONS
The threat of nuclear terrorism will grow as more countries
develop nuclear weapons, more security lapses occur in the former
Soviet Union, and more fissile material becomes available due to
disarmament and expanded power programs. Stopping nuclear
terror at the source is the best bet for safeguarding America, but the
focus should extend to territorial security as well, so that a terrorist
device can be intercepted at its delivery site.
A. Counter-Terrorism: Hit the Sponsors
A firm counterterror policy will be a necessary part of any
comprehensive effort to prevent nuclear terrorism. This means no
negotiations with terrorists, no trading arms for hostages, and not
allowing actions like embassy seizures to go unpunished. Punishment
must be of a military nature. Economic sanctions do not send a
strong enough message. Libya and Iran are subject to numerous
sanctions which have yet to prevent them from sponsoring terror.
Punishing the sponsors would go a long way toward shutting
down the more sophisticated terror organizations most likely to be
interested in nuclear weapons. Syria holds sway over terrorist
training camps in the Bekaa Valley (and the opium fields used to
finance them)."' Sudan provides safe haven to all sorts of groups31"
Iran funds attacks against American targets.313 Terrorism is an
increasingly preferred way for America's enemies to lash out. Strong
measures must be taken to reverse the trend.
B. U.S. Security
Nuclear terrorism is in many ways as problematic a policy issue
as is drug trafficking. The challenge is to keep quantities of material
and the people associated with that material out of the country. For
nuclear terrorism, however, the stakes are higher. If one shipment of
311. See generally COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM, supranote 16, at 28.

312. See generally id. at 27.
313. Saudi Arabia has presented strong evidence that Iran was behind the Khobar Towers
attack on U.S. forces in Dhahran. See R. Jeffrey Smith, Saudis Offer Evidence of Iran Terror,
INT'L HERALD TRIB., Dec. 12, 1996, at 2, available in LEXIS, World Library, IHT File.
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cocaine reaches its distributor, the ramifications are not so serious. If
a piece of plutonium the size of a baseball makes it to bomb builders
in New York, the consequences could be dire indeed. The challenge
is to find nuclear materials before they reach their targets, and do so
in a way that overcomes American failures on the drug and
immigration fronts.

Technology may save the day, but Washington must focus on the
right solutions. For example, the U.S. Customs Service has plans to
provide 1,500 inspectors posted at entry ports and international
airports with pager-sized gamma ray detectors.1 Though the devices
would be good for detecting radiological devices and weapons made
with irradiated reactor-grade materials, weapons-grade material is
not very radioactive. Therefore, shielding should be able to defeat
the detectors, which given their small size are probably not very
powerful anyway.
Better advances will be required. An ideal solution would be a
satellite-based system, which can monitor the entire country to detect
warheads and fissile materials. While such a system can presently
work for exposed and highly radioactive sources in generally specific
locations, low-emission and shielded materials are still problematic."'
It might be helpful to develop a detector which could differentiate
metals such as lead, steel, beryllium, uranium, and
between heavy
31 6
plutonium.
Another idea would be to follow Moscow's lead and install
radiation detectors at key points throughout major cities.317 While
shielding would remain a problem, such a system might catch
terrorists while they are assembling a bomb, arming it, or otherwise
interacting with an unshielded device. What the United States needs
to be working on is a system which will detect a nuclear weapon from
considerable distances despite shielding. Whether the detectors
focus on radiation, isotope concentrations, heavy-metal densities, or
the presence of high-explosives, an effective bomb detector would be
an invaluable tool in the fight against nuclear terror.

314. See Customs Inspectors To Get Devices To Find Radioactivity, ORLANDO SENTINEL,

Oct. 6,1996, at A26, availablein LEXIS, News Library, Orsent File.
315. See discussion suprap. 115.
316. A heavy-metal detector might allow NEST to find a bomb in an urban environment,
perhaps even by detecting lead shielding.

However, such a detector would have to be

sophisticated enough not to be confused by the high metal content of buildings, sewer systems,
and other urban structures.

317. See Cameron, supranote 31, at 425.

128

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 8:79

Finally, implementation of security protocols for protecting the
population should be reviewed. Evacuating target cities creates its
own problems, as discussed previously.1 8 If the terrorists are not
considerate enough to name the target, does the United States
evacuate several cities? Which ones? How many? Also, while
NEST can find a bomb discretely, NEST's failure to find a weapon is
not proof that the weapon is not present.
C. More Proliferation: The Expanding Nuclear Club
Proliferation is a major factor in nuclear terrorism. Each
country with a nuclear arsenal is a potential supplier to terrorists. A
bomb can be stolen, sold by corrupt officials, transferred to terrorists
by a central authority, or lost in transit. If a nuclear-capable state has
research labs, reactors, and enrichment facilities, then fissile material
is subject to the same risks. So the more countries that have nuclear
weapons or weapons development programs, the more likely that
terrorists are going to get their hands on fissile material or even a
working weapon. In addition, most proliferators will not have the
security measures, such as PALs, and the relatively loyal personnel
one finds in the United States, Britain, or France.
As of December 1997, nine countries have nuclear capabilities:
the United States, Russia, Britain, France, China, Israel, India,
Pakistan, and North Korea. 9
Moreover, at least a dozen other states, like Japan, could easily
produce nuclear weapons if they so desiredYm Indeed, Japan is often
said to be "a screwdriver away" from nuclear weapons capability,
meaning that it has all the component parts, fissle material, and
experienced manpower to build a bomb on short notice. 2 In fact,
thanks to its breeder reactors, Japan will have enough plutonium by
the year 2000 to manufacture 10,000 nuclear weapons.' Thus, the
number of states that could serve as sources of fissile material or
318. See discussion supra p. 133.
319. Some may quibble about North Korea's nuclear capabilities, but evidence strongly
indicates that North Korea has a few bombs, or could put one together on short notice. See
Sublette, supra note 98,-at 7.3.5. In any event, inclusion of North Korea on the 1997 list is not
critical to the argument.
320. Examples include Belgium Canada, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway,
Sweden, and Switzerland. See KATHLEEN C. BAILEY, DOOMSDAY WEAPONS IN THE HANDS

OF MANY: THE ARMS CONTROL CHALLENGE OF THE 90S 30 (1991).
321. See Japan to "Go Nuclear" in Asian Arms Race, SUNDAY TIMES, Jan. 30, 1994,
availablein LEXIS, Europe Library, Ttimes File.
322. See Sublette, supranote 98, at 7.5.5.
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bomb components is actually larger than a mere listing of nuclear
capable states would indicate.
So what is the best case scenario for proliferation? India and
Pakistan are convinced to disarm. A comprehensive and all-inclusive
Middle East peace package leads to Israeli disarmament in exchange
for a proliferation shutdown in all Middle-Eastern states pursuing the
bomb. North Korea unites with the South and is no longer a threat.
START II is fully implemented, bringing the United States and
Russia down to about 3,500 warheads each. 3 The nuclear club is
reduced to five, each with a relatively small and easily-secured
arsenal, and a large portion of the warheads in each stockpile are at
sea aboard submarines-about the safest place for nuclear weapons.
But this best-case scenario is not very likely. India and Pakistan
show little sign of trusting each other. Indeed, the two almost traded
nuclear blows in 1990 after an Indian Army exercise spooked
Islamabad, which loaded some F-16s with nuclear bombs "just in
case."324 A comprehensive Middle East nuclear agreement would
have to include Iran as well as the other states, which is unlikely. The
two Koreas could unite, but the North might also get desperate and
invade the South. START II may go through, but the Russian Duma
appears to be in no hurry on ratification."
Now consider the list of countries with the potential to attain
nuclear capabilities by, to pick a date, December, 2006: Iran, Brazil,
Taiwan, Syria, Argentina, South Korea, Libya, Egypt, and Algeria.
This grouping assumes that South Korea decides to counter the
North, possibly to create a state of d6tente in the face of a North
Korean invasion and a vastly reduced U.S. military presence.
Taiwan, upset by Beijing's handling of Hong Kong after 1997, wants
to ensure China stays on its side of the strait.' This listing also
assumes that all Middle Eastern states pursuing nuclear weapons are
successful, except for Iraq, which is still subject to international
monitoring.'
Brazil and Argentina iboth gave up their nuclear
323. However, such a reduction may lead to other problems since dismantling large
numbers of weapons leads to more fissile material in transit or storage.
324. See Seymour M. Hersh, On the Nuclear Edge, NEW YORKER, Mar. 29,1993, at 56,65.
325. See Sublette, supra note 98, at 7.1.

326. South Korea and Taiwan have actually pursued nuclear weapons, but both stopped
after intense U.S. pressure, and presumably security guarantees. See id. at 7.4.5; 7.4.8. The

American nuclear umbrella was probably both safer and cheaper.
327. This is an assumption in ten years time. Barring a drastic change in leadership, Iraq

could get the bomb in the next decade if the international community's desire for Iraqi oil leads
to relaxed monitoring.
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projects, but if Brazil has indeed restarted its program, Argentina will
surely follow suit.
As bad as it looks, this list could be worse. As noted, Iraq was
left off. Japan could go nuclear given the changes in the Asian
The general scope of proliferation and the
security structure.'
accompanying spread of missile technology might encourage more
European powers to go nuclear, especially if the United States
further withdraws from Europe, NATO expansion plans collapse, or
Russia reverts to its old ways.3 9
Given the fall of the Soviet Empire and recent fiascoes in
Bosnia, Somalia, and Rwanda, perceptions about American security
guarantees may have changed. If a country believes that such
guarantees are diminished, the nuclear umbrella may no longer be a
good bet. And that could mean further proliferation.
In any event, the suggested 2006 listing is double that of today's
membership. Political stability is a key factor in proliferation and the
state sponsorship of terrorism. If Egypt develops a nuclear weapon
and falls to an Islamic fundamentalist government, an increasingly
likely scenario given the weakness of the Mubarak regime,3' the
potential for mischief grows substantially. Therefore, the United
States must work to ensure that countries with nuclear weapons
remain stable. How safe would a nuclear component be in Egypt? In
Algeria? With such instability, corruption, and poor security, the
answer is obvious. And state sponsorship takes on whole new
meanings when the sponsor is nuclear-capable. Thus, if proliferation
is not curbed, the risks of nuclear terror will increase dramatically.

328. One could argue that Japan would never go nuclear, because of Hiroshima and
Nagasaki. But the new generation of leaders was born too late to remember World War II, and
many want a permanent seat for Japan on the U.N. Security Council. See, e.g., Edward
Mortimer, Culture Clash. A New Book on the Decline of the West's Influence Fails to Give Due
Weight to the Endurance of its Civilization, FIN. TIMES (London), Jan. 15, 1997, Comment &
Analysis, at 26; see also Edward Mortimer, Security in Numbers: Expansion of the Security
Council is Fraught With Problems But Desirable Given US Indifference to the UN, FIN. TIMES

(USA), Aug. 27, 1997, Comment & Analysis, at 8. The five current permanent members have
nuclear weapons, so why not Japan?
329. If NATO expansion does not go through, some states in Eastern Europe may want to
go nuclear. Indeed, the Baltics will likely be left out of any NATO expansion in the near
future. See, e.g., Charles Clover, Lebed warns on Nato expansion, FIN. TIMES (USA), Oct. 7,

1997, News Europe, at 3. Therefore, they might want a deterrent. Would Russia invade to shut
down a Baltic bomb project?
330. See DUNNIGAN AND BAY, supranote 6, at 93.
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D. The New Deterrence and a Comprehensive Policy
A credible deterrent posture could go a long way toward
preventing nuclear terror, at least in dealing with "rational" actors. 3"
If terrorists and state sponsors become convinced that they will not
get away with an act of nuclear terror, they might at least think twice.
Creating a credible deterrent will require a multi-phased policy.
First, of course, is intelligence. The United States must attempt
to obtain every piece of information available concerning
proliferation, loose nukes, which scientists are working where, what
fissile material supplies are vulnerable, and which terrorist
organizations are shopping for atomic weapons. Help from Israel,
Russia, and other countries will be invaluable. Thus, Washington
should lean on those governments to supply what they know, in
exchange for our own intelligence, money, or anything else that will
grease the wheels.
The United States should also pursue a comprehensive
agreement with other nuclear weapons powers to mark each warhead
with unique isotope mixtures or other characteristics that can be used
to identify bombs by country of origin.332 GPS tracking and selfdestruct features should also be added. Washington should sell this
plan by emphasizing its value in avoiding false accusations in the
event of nuclear terror, while also suggesting that Moscow, Tel Aviv,
New Delhi, and Paris could all very easily be targeted by atomic
terrorists.
Third, the United States must have a retaliatory policy modeled
after the flexible response doctrine. 3 Thus, in the event terrorists
331. Again, there is the problem of organizations whose members do not care if they are

killed as a result of their terrorist activities.
332. Perhaps the isotope ratios should be held in some sort of escrow system with the IAEA

or otherwise kept secret, as the system could be abused. For example, Iran might build a bomb
with another country's fissile material tags and set it off, hoping to avoid culpability.
333. The doctrine of flexible response is a concept "that NATO should be able to deter,
and if necessary to counter, military aggression at any level .... Flexible response requires a

balanced combination of both nuclear and conventional forces. These forces must be sufficient
to deter aggression and, should deterrence fail, be capable of direct defense, including
escalation under political control, to the level of response necessary to convince the aggressor

of the defender's determination and ability to resist, thus persuading him to cease the attack
and withdraw. An aggressor must be therefore be convinced of NATO's readiness to use
nuclear weapons if necessary, but he must be uncertain regarding the timing or the
circumstances in which they would be used." NATO INFORMATION SERVICE, THE NORTH
ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION: FACrS AND FIGURES 217 (1989); see generally GREGORY
SHAUN, NUCLEAR COMMAND AND CONTROL IN NATO: NUCLEAR WEAPONS OPERATIONS
AND THE STRATEGY OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE (1996).
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detonate a nuclear device in the United States or against some other
American target, the United States will respond in a manner of its
choosing. This may be nuclear retaliation, conventional bombing,
both or neither. 3 4 It could involve a military invasion to strip a statesponsor of its entire WMD 335 infrastructure. If the attack was without
state sponsorship, it might involve special forces, kidnappings, and hit
teams. Washington must make clear that nuclear terrorists will not
be safe anywhere-and that countries harboring nuclear terrorists
will pay.
Numerous, more legally-oriented approaches might look
appealing: making nuclear terrorism a crime against humanity,
creating a permanent international criminal court, or negotiating
treaties on sharing intelligence and extraditing terrorists. But these
measures do not really address the threat. Stronger measures will be
called for, and probably deemed acceptable, by the American people.
Tolerance of casualties and intervention in the affairs of other
countries will not be bothersome to the average citizen who will be
more concerned about when and where the next bomb might
explode.
The deterrent policy should also apply to attempts. If NEST was
lucky enough to find and disable a bomb before it detonated, this
should not absolve the perpetrators. They must be found and
punished before they get a chance to try again.
Once the
international community sees how the United States responds, others
wishing harm to America will be given pause.
Certainly, a strengthened NPT regime is desirable, as is a
complete ban on fissile material production. But these sorts of policy
solutions take time to implement. Given the amount of fissile
material in circulation, halting plutonium production will not save
America,336 and strengthening a legal regime means little to countries
which do not play by the rules. Averting incidents of nuclear terror
will take stronger measures-even some unpopular ones.
VII. CONCLUSION
Congressman Richard Gephardt provides this wakeup call on
the subject of nuclear terrorism:

334. See Dunn,supra note 138, at 44.
335. WMD is shorthand for weapons of mass destruction, which encompasses nuclear,
chemical, and biological weapons.
336. See BOWMAN, supranote 290, at 194.
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Anybody who thinks nuclear terrorism can't become a reality
hasn't faced reality. Anybody who thinks terrorists can't acquire
the technical knowledge to build an atom bomb hasn't picked up
your average encyclopedia or talked to a college physics major.
Anybody who thinks terrorists aren't cunning or ruthless enough
to pull off a nuclear attack has forgotten the Munich Olympics, the
showdown at Entebbe, or the shooting of the Pope. Anybody who
thinks an outlaw country won't help terrorists "go nuclear" hasn't
been to Teheran or Tripoli. 37
Some will deny the threat. They accept that some states and
groups might be inclined to resort to nuclear weapons, that nuclear
materials are less secure than they used to be, and that it is easier to
build a bomb now than it was in the 1940s. But they argue that it will
never happen, otherwise we would have already seen an act of
nuclear terror. 33 However, it is not really known whether or not
there have in fact already been such attempts. Any legitimate threat
or attempt successfully averted would have been kept very quiet to
avoid creating a panic. Therefore, the general public may not learn
of a nuclear incident unless it succeeds.
Simply put, one cannot predict the actual probability of nuclear
terror because there are too many unknowns. No one is sure how
much fissile material is in the wrong hands. No one knows for certain
that operable Russian weapons have not been sold or stolen. No one
can be safe in the assumption that terrorists will not cross the nuclear
threshold. Because of these uncertainties, the United States must
prepare itself for the worst.
Some day, people across this country could wake up, turn on
CNN, and see the big mushroom cloud in the sky. And the United
States would never be the same. An act of nuclear terror would not
only have significant impact in terms of loss of life and economic
harm, but the psychological damage would be substantial. Because
of its geography, America is in many ways sheltered from much of
the madness that currently reigns in certain regions of the world. A
single nuclear detonation would shake the confidence of the
American people and disabuse the population of the notion that their
government can protect them. There could be calls for expanded
police powers, curbs on immigration, and, possibly, even suspension
of civil liberties in order to ensure national security. Many countries
do not enjoy the same freedoms taken for granted by Americans
337. Richard A. Gephardt, The New Nightmare of Nuclear Terrorism, in NUCLEAR
TERRORISM 144,145 (Paul Leventhal & Yonah Alexander eds., 1986).
338. See generally Kamp, supranote 8.
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because those countries do not have the same degree of safety and
security. And that is the true nature of a national security breachwhen an external threat jeopardizes a nation's very way of life. If this
problem is not-adequately addressed, the United States might end up
swimming in that pool of hydrochloric acid, with its legs cut off.
Barry L. Rothberg

